Seward saw that new difficulties had arisen in the course of that fateful March which those colleagues of his in the Cabinet—­well-meaning, inferior men, to be sure—­had not the subtlety to comprehend.  Of course the matter of evacuation remained what it always had been, the plain open road to an ultimate diplomatic triumph.  Who but a president out of the West, or a minor member of the Cabinet, would fail to see that!  But there were two other considerations which, also, his well-meaning colleagues were failing to allow for.  While all this talk about the Virginia Unionists had been going on, while Washington and Richmond had been trying to negotiate, neither really had any control of its own game.  They were card players with all the trumps out of their hands.  Montgomery, the Confederate Congress, held the trumps.  At any minute it could terminate all this make-believe of diplomatic independence, both at Washington and at Richmond.  A few cannon shots aimed at Sumter, the cry for revenge in the North, the inevitable protest against coercion in Virginia, the convention blown into the air, and there you are—­War!

And after all that, who knows what next?  And yet, Blair and Chase and the rest would not consent to slip Montgomery’s trumps out of her hands—­the easiest thing in the world to do!—­by throwing Sumter into her lap and thus destroying the pretext for the cannon shots.  More than ever before, Seward would insist firmly on the evacuation of Sumter.

But there was the other consideration, the really new turn of events.  Suppose Sumter is evacuated; suppose Montgomery has lost her chance to force Virginia into war by precipitating the issue of coercion, what follows?  All along Seward had advocated a national convention to readjust all the matters “in dispute between the sections.”  But what would such a convention discuss?  In his inaugural, Lincoln had advised an amendment to the Constitution “to the effect that the Federal government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the State, including that of persons held to service.”  Very good!  The convention might be expected to accept this, and after this, of course, there would come up the Virginia Compromise.  Was it a practical scheme?  Did it form a basis for drawing back into the Union the lower South?

Seward’s whole thought upon this subject has never been disclosed.  It must be inferred from the conclusion which he reached, which he put into a paper entitled, Thoughts for the President’s Consideration, and submitted to Lincoln, April first.

The Thoughts outlined a scheme of policy, the most startling feature of which was an instant, predatory, foreign war.  There are two clues to this astounding proposal.  One was a political maxim in which Seward had unwavering faith.  “A fundamental principle of politics,” he said, “is always to be on the side of your country in a war.  It kills any party to oppose a war.  When Mr. Buchanan