Seward approached the problem in the same temper, with the same assumptions, that were his in the previous December.  He still believed that his main purpose was to enable a group of politicians to save their faces by effecting a strategic retreat.  Imputing to the Southern leaders an attitude of pure self-interest, he believed that if allowed to play the game as they desired, they would mark time until circumstances revealed to them whether there was more profit for them in the Union or out; he also believed that if sufficient time could be given, and if no armed clash took place, it would be demonstrated first, that they did not have so strong a hold on the South as they had thought they had; and second, that on the whole, it was to their interests to patch up the quarrel and come back into the Union.  But he also saw that they had a serious problem of leadership, which, if rudely handled, might make it impossible for them to stand still.  They had inflamed the sentiment of state-patriotism.  In South Carolina, particularly, the popular demand was for independence.  With this went the demand that Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, garrisoned by Federal troops, should be surrendered, or if not surrendered, taken forcibly from the United States.  A few cannon shots at Sumter would mean war.  An article in Seward’s creed of statecraft asserted that the populace will always go wild over a war.  To prevent a war fever in the North was the first condition of his policy at home.  Therefore, in order to prevent it, the first step in saving his enemies’ faces was to safeguard them against the same danger in their own calm.  He must help them to prevent a war fever in the South.  He saw but one way to do this.  The conclusion which became the bed rock of his policy was inevitable.  Sumter must be evacuated.

Even before the inauguration, he had broached this idea to Lincoln.  He had tried to keep Lincoln from inserting in the inaugural the words, “The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government.”  He had proposed instead, “The power confided in me shall be used indeed with efficacy, but also with discretion, in every case and exigency, according to the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections."(6) With the rejection of Seward’s proffered revision, a difference between them in policy began to develop.  Lincoln, says one of his secretaries, accepted Seward’s main purpose but did not share his “optimism."(7) It would be truer to say that in this stage of his development, he was lacking in audacity.  In his eager search for advice, he had to strike a balance between the daring Seward who at this moment built entirely on his own power of political devination, and the cautious remainder of the Cabinet who had their ears to the ground trying their best to catch the note of authority in the rumblings