Jaquess and Gilmore did their last small part in American history and left the stage.  They made a tour of the Northern States explaining to the various governors the purposes of their mission to Richmond, and reporting in full their audience with Davis and the impressions they had formed.(7) This was a point in favor of Lincoln—­as Andrew thought.  On the other hand, there were the editorials of The Times.  As late as the twenty-fourth of August, the day before the Washington conference, The Times asserted that the President would waive all the objects for which the war had been fought, including Abolition, if any proposition of peace should come that embraced the integrity of the Union.  To be sure, this was not consistent with the report of Jaquess and Gilmore and their statement of terms actually set down by Lincoln.  And yet—­it came from the Administration organ edited by the chairman of the Executive Committee.  Was “rescue” of the President anything more than a dream?

It was just here that Lincoln intervened and revolutionized the whole situation.  With what tense interest Andrew must have waited for reports of that conference held at Washington on the twenty-fifth.  And with what delight he must have received them!  The publication on the twenty-sixth of the sweeping repudiation of the negotiation policy; the reassertion that the Administration’s “sole and undivided purpose was to prosecute the war.”  Simultaneous was another announcement, also in the minds of the New Englanders, of first importance:  “So far as there being any probability of President Lincoln withdrawing from the canvass, as some have suggested, the gentlemen comprising the Committee express themselves as confident of his reelection."(8)

Meanwhile the letters asking for signatures to the pro-posed “call” had been circulated and the time had come to take stock of the result From Ohio, Wade had written in a sanguine mood.  He was for issuing the call the moment the Democratic Convention had taken action.(9) On the twenty-ninth that convention met.  On the thirtieth, the conspirators reassembled—­again at the house of David Dudley Field—­and Andrew attended.  He had not committed himself either way.

And now Lincoln’s firmness with the Executive Committee had its reward.  The New Englanders had made up their minds.  Personally, he was still obnoxious to them; but in light of his recent pronouncement, they would take their chances on “rescuing” him from the Committee; and since he would not withdraw, they would not cooperate in splitting the Union party.  But they could not convince the conspirators.  A long debate ended in an agreement to disagree.  The New Englanders withdrew, confessed partisans of Lincoln.(10) It was the beginning of the end.

Andrew went back to Boston to organize New England for Lincoln.  J. M. Forbes remained to organize New York.(11) All this, ignoring the Executive Committee.  It was a new Lincoln propaganda, not in opposition to the Committee but in frank rivalry:  “Since, or if, we must have Lincoln,” said Andrew, “men of motive and ideas must get into the lead, must elect him, get hold of ‘the machine’ and ‘run it’ themselves."(12)