But the Jacobins were not the men to give up the game until they were certainly in the last ditch.  Though their issues had been slipped out of their hands; though for the moment at least, it was not good policy to fight the President on a principle; it might still be possible to recover their prestige on some other contention.  The first of January was approaching.  The final proclamation of emancipation would bring to an end the temporary alliance of the Administration and the Abolitionists.  Who could say what new pattern of affairs the political kaleidoscope might not soon reveal?  Surely the Jacobin cue was to busy themselves, straightway, making trouble for the President.  Principles being unavailable, practices might do.  And who was satisfied with the way the war was going?  To rouse the party against the Administration on the ground of inefficient practices, of unsatisfactory military progress, might be the first step toward regaining their former dominance.

There was a feather in the wind that gave them hope.  The ominous first paragraph of the Emancipation Proclamation was evidence that the President was still stubbornly for his own policy; that he had not surrendered to the opposite view.  But this was not their only strategic hope.  Lincoln’s dealings with the army between September and December might, especially if anything in his course proved to be mistaken, deliver him into their hands.

Following Antietam, Lincoln had urged upon McClellan swift pursuit of Lee.  His despatches were strikingly different from those of the preceding spring.  That half apologetic tone had disappeared.  Though they did not command, they gave advice freely.  The tone was at least that of an equal who, while not an authority in this particular matter, is entitled to express his views and to have them taken seriously.

“You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness?  Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing?  Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess and act upon that claim . . . one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to operate upon the enemy’s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.  You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor.  Change positions with the enemy and think you not he would break your communications with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours. . . .

“If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications.  If he should prevent your seizing his communications and move toward Richmond; I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track.  I say ‘try’; if we never try we shall never succeed. . . .  We should not operate so as to merely drive him away. . . .  This letter is in no sense an order."(4)