Another train of thought also pointed to the same result.  Lincoln’s desire to further the cause of “the Liberal party throughout the world,” that desire which dated back to his early life as a politician, had suffered a disappointment.  European Liberals, whose political vision was less analytical than his, had failed to understand his policy.  The Confederate authorities had been quick to publish in Europe his official pronouncements that the war had been undertaken not to abolish slavery but to preserve the Union.  As far back as September, 1861, Carl Schurz wrote from Spain to Seward that the Liberals abroad were disappointed, that “the impression gained ground that the war as waged by the Federal government, far from being a war of principle, was merely a war of policy,” and “that from this point of view much might be said for the South."(9) In fact, these hasty Europeans had found a definite ground for complaining that the American war was a reactionary influence.  The concentration of American cruisers in the Southern blockade gave the African slave trade its last lease of life.  With no American war-ship among the West Indies, the American flag became the safeguard of the slaver.  Englishmen complained that “the swift ships crammed with their human cargoes” had only to “hoist the Stars and Stripes and pass under the bows of our cruisers."(10) Though Seward scored a point by his treaty giving British cruisers the right to search any ships carrying the American flag, the distrust of the foreign Liberals was not removed.  They inclined to stand aside and to allow the commercial classes of France and England to dictate policy toward the United States.  The blockade, by shutting off the European supply of raw cotton, on both sides the channel, was the cause of measureless unemployment, of intolerable misery.  There was talk in both countries of intervention.  Napoleon, especially, loomed large on the horizon as a possible ally of the Confederacy.  And yet, all this while, Lincoln had it in his power at any minute to lay the specter of foreign intervention.  A pledge to the “Liberal party throughout the world” that the war would bring about the destruction of slavery, and great political powers both in England and in France would at once cross the paths of their governments should they move toward intervention.  Weighty as were all these reasons for a change of policy—­turning the flank of the Vindictives on the war powers, committing the Abolitionists to the Administration, winning over the European Liberals—­there was a fourth reason which, very probably, weighed upon Lincoln most powerfully of them all.  Profound gloom had settled upon the country.  There was no enthusiasm for military service.  And Stanton, who lacked entirely the psychologic vision of the statesman, had recently committed an astounding blunder.  After a few months in power he had concluded that the government had enough soldiers and had closed the recruiting offices.(11) Why Lincoln permitted this singular proceeding has never been satisfactorily explained.* Now he was reaping the fruits.  A defeated army, a hopeless country, and no prospect of swift reinforcement!  If a shift of ground on the question of emancipation would arouse new enthusiasm, bring in a new stream of recruits, Lincoln was prepared to shift.