Such a message had no consolation for Chandler, Wade, or, as he then was, for Trumbull.  They looked about for a way to retaliate.  And now two things became plain.  That “agitation of the summer” to which Hay refers, had borne fruit, but not enough fruit.  Many members of Congress who had been swept along by the President’s policy in July had been won over in the reaction against him and were ripe for manipulation; but it was not yet certain that they held the balance of power in Congress.  To lock horns with the Administration, in December, would have been so rash a move that even such bold men as Chandler and Wade avoided it.  Instead, they devised an astute plan of campaign.  Trumbull was Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and in that important position would bide his time to bring pressure to bear on the President through his influence upon legislation.  Wade and Chandler would go in for propaganda.  But they would do so in disguise.  What more natural than that Congress should take an active interest in the army, should wish to do all in its power to “assist” the President in rendering the army-efficient.  For that purpose it was proposed to establish a joint committee of the two Houses having no function but to look into military needs and report to Congress.  The proposal was at once accepted and its crafty backers secured a committee dominated entirely by themselves.  Chandler was a member; Wade became Chairman.(3) This Committee on the Conduct of the War became at once an inquisition.  Though armed with no weapon but publicity, its close connection with congressional intrigue, its hostility to the President, the dramatic effect of any revelations it chose to make or any charges it chose to bring, clothed it indirectly with immense power.  Its inner purpose may be stated in the words of one of its members, “A more vigorous prosecution of the war and less tenderness toward slavery."(4) Its mode of procedure was in constant interrogation of generals, in frequent advice to the President, and on occasion in threatening to rouse Congress against him.(5) A session of the Committee was likely to be followed by a call on the President of either Chandler or Wade.

The Committee began immediately summoning generals before it to explain what the army was doing.  And every general was made to understand that what the Committee wanted, what Congress wanted, what the country wanted, was an advance—­“something doing” as soon as possible.

And now appeared another characteristic of the mood of these furious men.  They had become suspicious, honestly suspicious.  This suspiciousness grew with their power and was rendered frantic by being crossed.  Whoever disagreed with them was instantly an object of distrust; any plan that contradicted their views was at once an evidence of treason.