But forasmuch, cousin, as neither the beggar nor the prince is at free liberty to walk where they will, but neither of them would be suffered to walk in some places without men withstanding them and saying them nay; therefore if imprisonment be, as you grant it is, a lack of liberty to go where we please, I cannot see but the beggar and the prince, whom you reckon both at liberty, are by your own reason restrained in prison both.

VINCENT:  Yea, but uncle, both the one and the other have way enough to walk—­the one in his own ground and the other in other men’s, or in the common highway, where they may both walk till they be weary of walking ere any man say them nay.

ANTHONY:  So may, cousin, that king who had, as you yourself put the case, all the whole castle to walk in.  And yet you deny not that he is prisoner for all that—­though not so straitly kept, yet as verily prisoner as he that lieth in the stocks.

VINCENT:  But they may go at least to every place that they need, or that is commodious for them, and therefore they do not wish to go anywhere but where they may.  And therefore they are at liberty to go where they will.

ANTHONY:  I need not, cousin, to spend the time about impugning every part of this answer.  Let pass by that, though a prisoner were brought with his keeper into every place where need required, yet since he might not when he wished go where he wished for his pleasure alone, he would be, as you know well, a prisoner still.  And let pass over also that it would be needful for this beggar, and commodious for this king, to go into divers places where neither of them may come.  And let pass also that neither of them is lightly so temperately determined by what they both fain would so do indeed, if this reason of yours put them out of prison and set them at liberty and made them free, as I will well grant it doth if they so do indeed—­that is, if they have no will to go anywhere but where they may go indeed.

Then let us look on our other prisoners enclosed within a castle, and we shall find that the straitest kept of them both, if he get the wisdom and grace to quiet his mind and hold himself content with that place, and not long (as a woman with child longeth for her desires) to be gadding out anywhere else, is by the same reason of yours, while his will is not longing to be anywhere else, he is, I say, at his free liberty to be where he will.  And so he is out of prison too.

And, on the other hand, if, though his will be not longing to be anywhere else, yet because if his will so were he should not be so suffered, he is therefore not at his free liberty but a prisoner still, since your free beggar that you speak of and the prince that you call out of prison too, though they be (which I daresay few be) by some special wisdom so temperately disposed that they will have not the will to be anywhere but where they see that they may be suffered to be, yet, since if they did have that will they could not then be where they would, they lack the effect of free liberty and are both twain in prison too.