“The inquiries made by House have led Wilson to believe that our enemies would not be unwilling to consider peace.  In view of the present condition of affairs, I repeat that there is only one possible course, namely, that Your Excellency [Von Jagow] empower me to declare that we will enter into negotiations with the United States touching the conduct of the submarine war while the negotiations are proceeding.  This would give us the advantage that the submarine war, being over Mr. Wilson’s head, like the sword of Damocles, would compel him at once to take in hand the task of mediation.”

This dispatch seems sufficiently to explain all the happenings of the summer and winter of 1916-1917.  It was sent to Berlin on April 26th; the German Government gave the Sussex “pledge” on May 4th, eight days afterward.  In this reply Germany declared that she would now expect Mr. Wilson to bring pressure upon Great Britain to secure a mitigation or suspension of the British blockade, and to this Mr. Wilson promptly and energetically replied that he regarded the German promise as an unconditional one and that the Government of the United States “cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants.  Responsibility in such matters is single not joint; absolute not relative.”

This reply gave satisfaction to both the United States and the countries of the Allies, and Page himself regarded it as a master stroke.  “The more I think of it,” he wrote on May 17th, “the better the strategy of the President appears, in his latest (and last) note to Germany.  They laid a trap for him and he caught them in their own trap.  The Germans had tried to ‘put it up’ to the President to commit the first unfriendly act.  He now ‘puts it up’ to them.  And this is at last bound to end the controversy if they sink another ship unlawfully.  The French see this clearly and so do the best English, and it has produced a most favourable impression.  The future?  The German angling for peace will prove futile.  They’ll have another fit of fury.  Whether they will again become reckless or commit ‘mistakes’ with their submarines will depend partly on their fury, partly on their fear to make a breach with the United States, but mainly on the state of their submarine fleet.  How many have the English caught and destroyed?  That’s the main question, after all.  The English view may not be fair to them.  But nobody here believes that they will long abstain from the luxury of crime.”