[Footnote 35:  President of the University of Virginia.]

[Footnote 36:  Hampton Institute, at Hampton, Va.]

[Footnote 37:  C. Alphonso Smith, Professor of English, U.S.  Naval Academy; Roosevelt Professor at Berlin, 1910-11.]

CHAPTER XIX

WASHINGTON IN THE SUMMER OF 1916

I

In July Page received a cablegram summoning him to Washington.  This message did not explain why his presence was desired, nor on this point was Page ever definitely enlightened, though there were more or less vague statements that a “change of atmosphere” might better enable the Ambassador to understand the problems which were then engrossing the State Department.

The President had now only a single aim in view.  From the date of the so-called Sussex “pledge,” May 4, 1916, until the resumption of submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, Mr. Wilson devoted all his energies to bringing the warring powers together and establishing peace.  More than one motive was inspiring the president in this determination.  That this policy accorded with his own idealistic tendencies is true, and that he aspired to a position in history as the great “peace maker” is probably the fact, but he had also more immediate and practical purposes in mind.  Above all, Mr. Wilson was bent on keeping the United States out of the war; he knew that there was only one certain way of preserving peace in this country, and that was by bringing the war itself to an end.  “An early peace is all that can prevent the Germans from driving us at last into the war,” Page wrote at about this time; and this single sentence gives the key to the President’s activities for the succeeding nine months.  The negotiations over the Sussex had taught Mr. Wilson this truth.  He understood that the pledge which the German Government had made was only a conditional one; that the submarine campaign had been suspended only for the purpose of giving the United States a breathing spell during which it could persuade Great Britain and France to make peace.

“I repeat my proposal,” Bernstorff cabled his government on April 26,[38] “to suspend the submarine war at least for the period of negotiations.  This would remove all danger of a breach [with the United States] and also enable Wilson to continue his labours in his great plan of bringing about a peace based upon the freedom of the seas—­i.e., that for the future trade shall be free from all interference in time of war.  According to the assurances which Wilson, through House, has given me, he would in that case take in hand measures directly against England.  He is, however, of the opinion that it would be easier to bring about peace than to cause England to abandon the blockade.  This last could only be brought about by war and it is well known that the means of war are lacking here.  A prohibition of exports as a weapon against the blockade is not possible as the prevailing prosperity would suffer by it.