on its way to the enemy.  The mere fact that it was transshipped at an intermediate neutral port was not important; the important point was the “ultimate destination.”  British shippers naturally raged over these decisions, but they met with little sympathy from their own government.  Great Britain filed no protest against the doctrine of “continuous voyage,” but recognized its fundamental soundness, and since 1865 this doctrine has been a part of international law.

Great Britain’s good sense in acquiescing in our Civil War practices now met its reward; for these decisions of American courts proved a godsend in her hour of trial.  The one neutral from which trouble was anticipated was the United States.  What better way to meet this situation than to base British maritime warfare upon the decisions of American courts?  What more ideal solution of the problem than to make Chief Justice Chase, of the United States Supreme Court, really the author of the British “blockade” against Germany?  The policy of the British Foreign Office was to use the sea power of Great Britain to crush the enemy, but to do it in a way that would not alienate American sympathy and American support; clearly the one way in which both these ends could be attained was to frame these war measures upon the pronouncements of American prize courts.  In a broad sense this is precisely what Sir Edward Grey now proceeded to do.  There was a difference, of course, which Great Britain’s enemies in the American Senate—­such men as Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, and Senator Thomas Walsh, of Montana—­proceeded to point out; but it was a difference of degree.  Great Britain based her blockade measures upon the American principle of “ultimate destination,” but it was necessary considerably to extend that doctrine in order to meet the necessities of the new situation.  President Lincoln had applied this principle to absolute contraband, such as powder, shells, rifles, and other munitions of war.  Great Britain now proceeded to apply it to that nebulous class of commodities known as “conditional contraband,” the chief of which was foodstuffs.  If the United States, while a war was pending, could evolve the idea of “ultimate destination” and apply it to absolute contraband, could not Great Britain, while another war was pending, carry it one degree further and make it include conditional contraband?  Thus reasoned the British Foreign Office.  To this Mr. Lansing replied that to stop foodstuffs on the way to Germany through a neutral port was simply to blockade a neutral port, and that this was something utterly without precedent.  Seizing contraband is not an act of war against the nation whose ships are seized; blockading a port is an act of war; what right therefore had Great Britain to adopt measures against Holland, Denmark, and Sweden which virtually amounted to a blockade?