this point of view. But Page believed that this
was nothing but Prussian bluff. The severance
of diplomatic relations at that time, in Page’s
opinion, would have convinced the Germans of the hopelessness
of their cause. In spite of the British blockade,
Germany was drawing enormous quantities of food supplies
from the United States, and without these supplies
she could not maintain indefinitely her resistance.
The severance of diplomatic relations would naturally
have been accompanied by an embargo suspending trade
between the United States and the Fatherland.
Moreover, the consideration that was mainly leading
Germany to hope for success was the belief that she
could embroil the United States and Great Britain
over the blockade. A break with Germany would
of course mean an end to that manoeuvre. Page
regarded all Mr. Wilson’s attempts to make peace
in 1914 and early 1915—before the Lusitania—as
mistakes, for reasons that have already been set forth.
Now, however, he believed that the President had a
real opportunity to end the war and the unparalleled
suffering which it was causing. The mere dismissal
of Bernstorff, in the Ambassador’s opinion,
would accomplish this result.
In a communication sent to the President on February 15, 1916, he made this plain.
To the President
February 15, 7 P.M.
The Cabinet has directed the Censor to suppress, as far as he can with prudence, comment which is unfavourable to the United States. He has taken this action because the public feeling against the Administration is constantly increasing. Because the Lusitania controversy has been going on so long, and because the Germans are using it in their renewed U-boat campaign, the opinion of this country has reached a point where only prompt action can bring a turn in the tide. Therefore my loyalty to you would not be complete if I should refrain from sending, in the most respectful terms, the solemn conviction which I hold about our opportunity and our duty.
If you immediately refuse to have further parley or to yield one jot or tittle of your original Lusitania notes, and if you at once break diplomatic relations with the German Empire, and then declare the most vigorous embargo of the Central Powers, you will quickly end the war. There will be an immediate collapse in German credit. If there are any Allies who are wavering, such action will hold them in line. Certain European neutrals—Sweden, Rumania, Greece, and others—will put up a firm resistance to Germanic influences and certain of them will take part with Great Britain and France. There will be an end at once to the German propaganda, which is now world-wide. The moral weight of our country will be a determining influence and bring an early peace. The credit you will receive for such a decision will make you immortal and even the people of Germany will be forever grateful.
It is my conviction
that we would not be called upon to fire a gun
or to lose one human
life.