“In view of the fact that they are so persistent, we have thought it well to inform you of them and to tell you how earnestly we hope that they are baseless.  We trust that you will set both our minds at rest.”

If Page had ever had any compunction about addressing the President in blunt phrases these expressions certainly convinced him that he was a free agent.

Yet Page himself at times had his doubts as to the value of this correspondence.  He would frequently discuss the matter with Mr. Laughlin.  “That’s a pretty harsh letter,” he would say.  “I don’t like to talk that way to the President, yet it doesn’t express half what I feel.”

“It’s your duty to tell the President the real state of affairs,” Mr. Laughlin would urge.

“But do you suppose it does any good?” Page would ask.

“Yes, it’s bound to, and whether it does or not, it’s your business to keep him informed.”

If in these letters Page seems to lay great stress on the judgment of Great Britain and Europe on American policy, it must be remembered that that was his particular province.  One of an Ambassador’s most important duties is to transmit to his country the public opinion of the country to which he is accredited.  It was Page’s place to tell Washington what Great Britain thought of it; it was Washington’s business to formulate policy, after giving due consideration to this and other matters.

     To Edward M. House

     July 21, 1915.

     DEAR HOUSE: 

I enclose a pamphlet in ridicule of the President.  I don’t know who wrote it, for my inquiries so far have brought no real information.  I don’t feel like sending it to him.  I send it to you—­to do with as you think best.  This thing alone is, of course, of no consequence.  But it is symptomatic.  There is much feeling about the slowness with which he acts.  One hundred and twenty people (Americans) were drowned on the Lusitania and we are still writing notes about it—­to the damnedest pirates that ever blew up a ship.  Anybody who knows the Germans knows, of course, that they are simply playing for time, that they are not going to “come down,” that Von Tirpitz is on deck, that they’d just as lief have war with us as not—­perhaps had rather—­because they don’t want any large nation left fresh when the war ends.  They’d like to have the whole world bankrupt.  There is a fast growing feeling here, therefore, that the American Government is pusillanimous—­dallies with ’em, is affected by the German propaganda, etc., etc.  Of course, such a judgment is not fair.  It is formed without knowing the conditions in the United States.  But I think you ought to realize the strength of this sentiment.  No doubt before you receive this, the President will send something to Germany that will amount to an ultimatum and there will be at least a momentary change of sentiment here.  But looking at