“Of course such a question is easy to ask and it is easy to give dogmatic answers.  But it isn’t easy to give an answer based on facts.  Our General Lassiter[57], for instance—­a man of sound judgment—­has in general been less hopeful of the military situation in France than most of the British officers.  But he is just now returned from the front, much cheered and encouraged.  ‘Lassiter,’ I asked, ’have the British in France or has any man among them what we call genius, or even wide vision; or are they merely plodding along at a mechanical task?  His answer was, ’We don’t see genius till it has done its job.  It is a mechanical task—­yes, that’s the nature of the struggle—­and they surely do it with intelligence and spirit.  There is waste.  There is waste in all wars.  But I come back much more encouraged.’

“The same sort of questions and answers are asked and given continuously about naval action.  Every discussion of the possibility of attacking the German naval bases ends without a plan.  So also with preventing the submarines from coming out.  These subjects have been continuously under discussion by a long series of men who have studied them; and the total effect so far has been to leave them among the impossible tasks.  So far as I can ascertain all naval men among the Allies agree that these things can’t be done.

“Here again—­Is this a merely routine professional opinion—­a merely traditional opinion—­or is it a lack of imagination?  The question will not down.  Yet it is impossible to get facts to combat it.  What are the limits of the practicable?

“Mr. Balfour told me yesterday his personal conviction about the German colonies, which, he said, he had not discussed with his associates in the Cabinet.  His firm opinion is that they ought not to be returned to the Germans, first for the sake of humanity.  ’The natives—­the Africans especially—­have been so barbarously treated and so immorally that it would be inhuman to permit the Germans to rule and degrade them further.  But Heaven forbid that we should still further enlarge the British Empire.  As a practical matter I do not care to do that.  Besides, we should incur the criticism of fighting in order to get more territory, and that was not and is not our aim.  If the United States will help us, my wish is that these German Colonies that we have taken, especially in Africa, should be “internationalized.”  There are great difficulties in such a plan, but they are not insuperable if the great Powers of the Allies will agree upon it.’  And much more to the same effect.  The parts of Asiatic Turkey that the British have taken, he thought, might be treated in the same way.”

FOOTNOTES: 

[Footnote 52:  At this time the proposal of such a gift found much popular favour.  However, the plan was not carried through.]

[Footnote 53:  At the meeting of Page and the President at Shadow Lawn, September 22, 1916.  See Chapter XIX.]