of the man-in-the-street were unprintable, but more serious than these was the impression which Mr. Wilson’s dubious remarks made upon those Englishmen who had always been especially friendly to the United States and who had even defended the President in previous crises.  Lord Bryce, who had accepted philosophically the Presidential statement that the United States was not “concerned with the causes” of the war, could not regard so indulgently this latest judgment of Great Britain and Germany.  “Bryce came to see me in a state of great depression,” wrote Page.  “He has sent Mr. Wilson a personal letter on this matter.”  Northcliffe commanded his newspapers, the Times and the Daily Mail, to discuss the note in a judicial spirit, but he himself told Mr. Page that “everybody is as angry as hell.”  When someone attempted to discuss the Wilson note with Mr. Asquith, he brushed the subject away with a despairing gesture.  “Don’t talk to me about it,” he said.  “It is most disheartening.”  But the one man in England who was perhaps the most affected was King George.  A man who had attended luncheon at Buckingham Palace on December 21st gave Page a description of the royal distress.  The King, expressing his surprise and dismay that Mr. Wilson should think that Englishmen were fighting for the same things in this war as the Germans, broke down.

The world only now understands the dreadful prospect which was opening before Europe at the moment when this Presidential note added a new cause for general despondency.  Rumania had collapsed, the first inkling of the Russian revolution had been obtained, the British well knew that the submarine warfare was to be resumed, and British finances were also in a desperate plight.  More and more it was becoming evident to the British statesmen that they needed the intervention of the United States.  This is the reason why they could not destroy the chances of American help by taking official offense even at what Page, in a communication to the Secretary of State, did not hesitate to call President Wilson’s “insulting words”; and hence their determination to silence the press and to give no outward expression of what they felt.  Page’s interview with Lord Robert Cecil on December 26th, while the Presidential communication was lying on his desk, discloses the real emotions of Englishmen.  Apparently Page’s frank cables concerning the reception of this paragraph had caused a certain interest in the State Department; at least the Ambassador was instructed to call at the Foreign Office and explain that the interpretation which had been commonly put upon the President’s words was not the one which he had intended.  At the same time Page was instructed to request the British Foreign Office, in case its reply were “favourable,” not to publish it, but to communicate it secretly to the American Government.  The purpose of this request is a little obscure; possibly it was the President’s plan to use such a favourable reply to force Germany likewise to display an acquiescent mood.  The object of Page’s call was to present this disclaimer.