Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice

     Foreign Office,

     December 18, 1916.

     SIR: 

The American Ambassador came to see me this morning and presented to me the German note containing what is called in it the “offer of peace.”  He explained that he did so on instructions of his Government as representing the German Government, and not in any way as representing their own opinions.  He also explained that the note must be regarded as coming from the four Central Powers, and as being addressed to all the Entente Powers who were represented by the United States.

He then read to me a telegram from his Government, but declined to leave me a copy of it.  The first part of the telegram explained that the Government of the United States would deeply appreciate a confidential intimation of the response to be made to the German note and that they would themselves have certain representations to make to the Entente Powers, to which they urgently begged the closest consideration.  The telegram went on to explain that the Government of the United States had had it in mind for some time past to make such representations on behalf of neutral nations and humanity, and that it must not be thought that they were prompted by the Governments of the Central Powers.  They wished us to understand that the note of the Central Powers created a good opportunity for making the American representations, but was not the cause of such representations being made.

     I replied that I could of course say nothing to him on such an
     important matter without consulting my colleagues.

     I am, etc.,

     ROBERT CECIL.

     Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice

     Foreign Office,

     19 December, 1916.

     SIR: 

     The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon.

I asked him whether he could tell me why his government were anxious to have confidential information as to the nature of our response to the German peace note.  He replied that he did not know, but he imagined it was to enable them to frame the representations of which he had spoken to me.

I then told him that we had asked the French to draft a reply, and that it would then be considered by the Allies, and in all probability an identic note would be presented in answer to the German note.  I thought it probable that we should express our view that it was impossible to deal with the German offer, since it contained no specific proposals.

He said that he quite understood this, and that we should in fact reply that it was an offer “to buy a pig in a poke” which we were not prepared to accept.  He added that he thought his Government would fully anticipate a reply in this sense, and he himself obviously approved it.

     Then, speaking quite seriously, he said that he had heard people in
     London treating the German offer with derision, but that no doubt
     the belligerent governments would treat it seriously.