was not one of hope; it was one of confidence.  The capture of Constantinople, of course, would have brought an early success to the allied army on all fronts[108].  This was the mood that was spurring on the British public to its utmost exertions, and, with such a determination prevailing everywhere, a step in the direction of peace was the last thing that the British desired; such a step could have been interpreted only as an attempt to deprive the Allies of their victory and as an effort to assist Germany in escaping the consequences of her crimes.  Combined with this stout popular resolve, however, there was a lack of confidence in the Asquith ministry.  An impression was broadcast that it was pacifist, even “defeatist,” in its thinking, and that it harboured a weak humanitarianism which was disposed to look gently even upon the behaviour of the Prussians.  The masses suspected that the ministry would welcome a peace with Germany which would mean little more than a cessation of hostilities and which would leave the great problems of the war unsolved.  That this opinion was unjust, that, on the contrary, the British Foreign Office was steadily resisting all attempts to end the war on an unsatisfactory basis, Page’s correspondence, already quoted, abundantly proves, but this unreasoning belief did prevail and it was an important factor in the situation.  This is the reason why the British Cabinet regarded Colonel House’s visit at that time with positive alarm.  It feared that, should the purpose become known, the British public and press would conclude that the Government had invited a peace discussion.  Had any such idea seized the popular mind in February and March, 1915, a scandal would have developed which would probably have caused the downfall of the Asquith Ministry.  “Don’t fool yourself about peace,” Page writes to his son Arthur, about this time.  “If any one should talk about peace, or doves, or ploughshares here, they’d shoot him.”

Colonel House reached London early in February and was soon in close consultation with the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey.  He made a great personal success; the British statesmen gained a high regard for his disinterestedness and his general desire to serve the cause of decency among nations; but he made little progress in his peace plans, simply because the facts were so discouraging and so impregnable.  Sir Edward repeated to him what he had already said to Page many times:  that Great Britain was prepared to discuss a peace that would really safeguard the future of Europe, but was not prepared to discuss one that would merely reinstate the regime that had existed before 1914.  The fact that the Germans were not ready to accept such a peace made discussion useless.  Disappointed at this failure, Colonel House left for Berlin.  His letters to Page show that the British judgment of Germany was not unjust and that the warnings which Page had sent to Washington were based on facts: