Now—­did General French send for me and tell me this just for fun and just because he likes me?  He was very eager to know my opinion whether this peace offer were genuine or whether it was a trick of the Germans to—­publish it later and thereby to throw the blame for continuing the war on England?

It occurs to me as possible that he was directed to tell me what he told, trusting to me, in spite of his protestations of personal confidence, etc., to get it to the President.  Assuming that the President sent the Kaiser’s message to the King, this may be a suggested informal answer—­that if the offer be extended to give France and Russia what they want, it will be considered, etc.  This may or may not be true.  Alas! the fact that I know nothing about the offer has no meaning; for the State Department never informs me of anything it takes up with the British Ambassador in Washington.  Well, I’ll see.

* * * * *

These were therefore the reasons why Colonel House had decided to go to Europe and enter into peace negotiations with the warring powers.  Colonel House was wise in taking all possible precautions to conceal the purpose of this visit.  His letter intimates that the German Government was eager to have him cross the ocean on this particular mission; it discloses, on the other hand, that the British Government regarded the proposed negotiations with no enthusiasm.  Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith would have been glad to end hostilities on terms that would permanently establish peace and abolish the vices which were responsible for the war, and they were ready to welcome courteously the President’s representative and discuss the situation with him in a fair-minded spirit.  But they did not believe that such an enterprise could serve a useful purpose.  Possibly the military authorities, as General French’s remarks to Page may indicate, did not believe that either side could win a decisive victory, but this was not the belief of the British public itself.  The atmosphere in England at that time was one of confidence in the success of British arms and of suspicion and distrust of the British Government.  A strong expectation prevailed in the popular mind, that the three great Powers of the Entente would at an early date destroy the menace which had enshrouded Europe for forty years, and there was no intention of giving Germany a breathing spell during which she could regenerate her forces to resume the onslaught.  In the winter of 1915 Great Britain was preparing for the naval attack on the Dardanelles, and its success was regarded as inevitable.  Page had an opportunity to observe the state of optimism which prevailed in high British circles.  In March of 1915 he was visiting the Prime Minister at Walmer Castle; one afternoon Mr. Asquith took him aside, informed him of the Dardanelles preparations and declared that the Allies would have possession of Constantinople in two weeks.  The Prime Minister’s attitude