Ambassador should not have been told of this, but Page learned of the proposal from Field Marshal French, then commanding the British armies in the field, and this accounts for Colonel House’s explanation that, “the reason you had no information, in regard to what General French mentioned was because no one knew of it outside of the President and myself and there was no safe way to inform you.”  Page has left a memorandum which explains the whole strange proceeding—­a paper which is interesting not only for its contents, but as an illustration of the unofficial way in which diplomacy was conducted in Washington at this time: 

* * * * *

Field Marshal Sir John French, secretly at home from his command of the English forces in France, invited me to luncheon.  There were his especially confidential friend Moore, the American who lives with him, and Sir John’s private secretary.  The military situation is this:  a trench stalemate in France.  Neither army has made appreciable progress in three months.  Neither can advance without a great loss of men.  Neither is whipped.  Neither can conquer.  It would require a million more men than the Allies can command and a very long time to drive the Germans back across Belgium.  Presently, if the Russians succeed in driving the Germans back to German soil, there will be another trench stalemate there.  Thus the war wears a practically endless outlook so far as military operations are concerned.  Germany has plenty of men and plenty of food for a long struggle yet; and, if she use all the copper now in domestic use in the Empire, she will probably have also plenty of ammunition for a long struggle.  She is not nearly at the end of her rope either in a military or an economic sense.

What then?  The Allies are still stronger—­so long as they hold together as one man.  But is it reasonable to assume that they can?  And, even if they can, is it worth while to win a complete victory at such a cost as the lives of practically all the able-bodied men in Europe?  But can the Allies hold together as one man for two or three or four years?  Well, what are we going to do?  And here came the news of the lunch.  General French informed me that the President had sent to England, at the request of the Kaiser, a proposal looking toward peace, Germany offering to give up Belgium and to pay for its restoration.

“This,” said Sir John, “is their fourth proposal.”

“And,” he went on, “if they will restore Belgium and give Alsace-Lorraine to France and Constantinople will go to Russia, I can’t see how we can refuse it.”

He scouted the popular idea of “crushing out militarism” once for all.  It would be desirable, even if it were not necessary, to leave Germany as a first-class power.  We couldn’t disarm her people forever.  We’ve got to leave her and the rest to do what they think they must do; and we must arm ourselves the best we can against them.