attempts of the preceding winter, and it was inclined to place the responsibility for this failure upon Great Britain and France.  “The President’s judgment,” wrote Colonel House on August 4, 1915, three months after the Lusitania went down, “was that last autumn was the time to discuss peace parleys, and we both saw present possibilities.  War is a great gamble at best, and there was too much at stake in this one to take chances.  I believe if one could have started peace parleys in November, we could have forced the evacuation of both France and Belgium, and finally forced a peace which would have eliminated militarism on land and sea.  The wishes of the Allies were heeded with the result that the war has now fastened itself upon the vitals of Europe and what the end may be is beyond the knowledge of man.”

This shows that the efforts which the Administration was making were not casual or faint-hearted, but that they represented a most serious determination to bring hostilities to an end.  This letter and the correspondence which now took place with Page also indicate the general terms upon which the Wilson Administration believed that the mighty differences could be composed.  The ideas which Colonel House now set forth were probably more the President’s than his own; he was merely the intermediary in their transmission.  They emphasized Mr. Wilson’s conviction that a decisive victory on either side would be a misfortune for mankind.  As early as August, 1914, this was clearly the conviction that underlay all others in the President’s interpretation of events.  His other basic idea was that militarism should come to an end “on land and sea”; this could mean nothing except that Germany was expected to abandon its army and that Great Britain was to abandon its navy.

From Edward M. House 115 East 53rd Street, New York City.  January 4th, 1915.

     DEAR PAGE: 

     I believe the Dual Alliance is thoroughly ready for peace and I
     believe they would be willing to agree upon terms England would
     accept provided Russia and France could be satisfied.

     They would, in my opinion, evacuate both Belgium and France and
     indemnify the former, and they would, I think, be willing to begin
     negotiations upon a basis looking to permanent peace.

It would surprise me if the Germans did not come out in the open soon and declare that they have always been for peace, that they are for peace now, and that they are willing to enter into a compact which would insure peace for all time; that they have been misrepresented and maligned and that they leave the entire responsibility for the continuation of the war with the Allies.

If they should do this, it would create a profound impression, and if it was not met with sympathy by the Allies, the neutral sentiment, which is now almost wholly against the Germans, would veer toward them.

     Will you not convey this thought to Sir Edward and let me know what
     he says?