“You and M. Jusserand,” replied the American, “have devoted your whole lives to diplomacy with distinguished ability and you can therefore answer that question better than I.”

“I can assure you,” replied M. Jusserand, “that no ambassador under the German system would dare for a moment to make such a statement without being authorized to do so.”

“The Germans,” added Sir Cecil, “have a way of making such statements unofficially and then denying that they have ever made them.”

Both the British and French ambassadors, however, thought that the proposal should be seriously considered.

“If it holds out one chance in a hundred of lessening the length of the war, we should entertain it,” said Ambassador Jusserand.

“I certainly hope that you will entertain it cordially,” said Mr. Straus.

“Not cordially—­that is a little too strong.”

“Well, sympathetically?”

“Yes, sympathetically,” said M. Jusserand, with a smile.

These facts were at once cabled to Page, who took the matter up with Sir Edward Grey.  A despatch from the latter to the British Ambassador in Washington gives a splendid summary of the British attitude on such approaches at this time.

     Sir Edward Grey to Sir Cecil Spring Rice
     Foreign Office,
     September 9, 1914.

     SIR: 

The American Ambassador showed me to-day a communication that he had from Mr. Bryan.  It was to the effect that Mr. Straus and Mr. Speyer had been talking with the German Ambassador, who had said that, though he was without instructions, he thought that Germany might be disposed to end the war by mediation.  This had been repeated to Mr. Bryan, who had spoken to the German Ambassador, and had heard the same from him.  Mr. Bryan had taken the matter up, and was asking direct whether the German Emperor would accept mediation if the other parties who were at war would do the same.

The American Ambassador said to me that this information gave him a little concern.  He feared that, coming after the declaration that we had signed last week with France and Russia about carrying on the war in common[100], the peace parties in the United States might be given the impression that Germany was in favour of peace, and that the responsibility for continuing the war was on others.

I said that the agreement that we had made with France and Russia was an obvious one; when three countries were at war on the same side, one of them could not honourably make special terms for itself and leave the others in the lurch.  As to mediation, I was favourable to it in principle, but the real question was:  On what terms could the war be ended?  If the United States could devise anything that would bring this war to an end and prevent another such war being forced on Europe I should welcome the proposal.

     The Ambassador said that before the war began I had made
     suggestions for avoiding it, and that these suggestions had been
     refused.