It was proposed that the United States at the same time should publish a note withdrawing its suggestion for the adoption of the Declaration, and explaining that it proposed to rest the rights of its citizens upon the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States.  This solution was accepted.  It was a defeat for Mr. Lansing, of course, but he had no alternative.  The relief that Page felt is shown in the following memorandum, written soon after the tension had ceased: 

* * * * *

“That insistence on the Declaration entire came near to upsetting the whole kettle of fish.  It put on me the task of insisting on a general code—­at a time when the fiercest war in history was every day becoming fiercer and more desperate—­which would have prevented the British from putting on their contraband list several of the most important war materials—­accompanied by a proposal that would have angered every neutral nation through which supplies can possibly reach Germany and prevented this Government from making friendly working arrangements with them; and, after Sir Edward Grey had flatly declined for these reasons, I had to continue to insist.  I confess it did look as if we were determined to dictate to him how he should conduct the war—­and in a way that distinctly favoured the Germans.

“I presented every insistence; for I should, of course, not have been excusable if I had failed in any case vigorously to carry out my instructions.  But every time I plainly saw matters getting worse and worse; and I should have failed of my duty also if I had not so informed the President and the Department.  I can conceive of no more awkward situation for an Ambassador or for any other man under Heaven.  I turned the whole thing over in my mind backward and forward a hundred times every day.  For the first time in this stress and strain, I lost my appetite and digestion and did not know the day of the week nor what month it was—­seeing the two governments rushing toward a very serious clash, which would have made my mission a failure and done the Administration much hurt, and have sowed the seeds of bitterness for generations to come.

“One day I said to Anderson (whose assistance is in many ways invaluable):  ’Of course nobody is infallible—­least of all we.  Is it possible that we are mistaken?  You and Laughlin and I, who are close to it all, are absolutely agreed.  But may there not be some important element in the problem that we do not see?  Summon and nurse every doubt that you can possibly muster up of the correctness of our view, put yourself on the defensive, recall every mood you may have had of the slightest hesitation, and tell me to-morrow of every possible weak place there may be in our judgment and conclusions.’  The next day Anderson handed me seventeen reasons why it was unwise to persist in this demand for the adoption of the Declaration of London.  Laughlin gave a similar opinion.