was away and Lansing, who had not mentioned the matter to Sir Cecil[94], prepared a long communication to you which he sent to the President for approval.  The President and I went over it and I strongly urged not sending it until I could have a conference with Sir Cecil.  I had this conference the next day without the knowledge of any one excepting the President, and had another the day following.  Sir Cecil told me that if the dispatch had gone to you as written and you had shown it to Sir Edward Grey, it would almost have been a declaration of war; and that if, by any chance, the newspapers had got hold of it as they so often get things from our State Department, the greatest panic would have prevailed.  He said it would have been the Venezuela incident magnified by present conditions.

     At the President’s suggestion, Lansing then prepared a cablegram
     to you.  This, too, was objectionable and the President and I
     together softened it down into the one you received.

     Faithfully yours,
     E.M.  HOUSE.

In justice to Mr. Lansing, a passage in a later letter of Colonel House must be quoted:  “It seems that Lansing did not write the particular dispatch to you that was objected to.  Someone else prepared it and Lansing rather too hastily submitted it to the President, with the result you know.”

This suppressed communication is probably for ever lost, but its tenor may perhaps be gathered from instructions which were actually sent to the Ambassador about this time.  After eighteen typewritten pages of not too urbanely expressed discussion of the Declaration of London and the general subject of contraband, Page was instructed to call the British Government’s attention to the consequences which followed shipping troubles in previous times.  It is hard to construe this in any other way than as a threat to Great Britain of a repetition of 1812: 

Confidential.  You will not fail to impress upon His Excellency[95] the gravity of the issues which the enforcement of the Order in Council seems to presage, and say to him in substance as follows: 

It is a matter of grave concern to this Government that the particular conditions of this unfortunate war should be considered by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to be such as to justify them in advancing doctrines and advocating practices which in the past aroused strong opposition on the part of the Government of the United States, and bitter feeling among the American people.  This Government feels bound to express the fear, though it does so reluctantly, that the publicity, which must be given to the rules which His Majesty’s Government announce that they intend to enforce, will awaken memories of controversies, which it is the earnest desire of the United States to forget or to pass over in silence. . . .

Germany, of course, promptly accepted the Declaration, for the suggestion fitted in perfectly with her programme; but Great Britain was not so acquiescent.  Four times was Page instructed to ask the British Government to accede unconditionally, and four times did the Foreign Office refuse.  Page was in despair.  In the following letter he notified Colonel House that if he were instructed again to move in this matter he would resign his ambassadorship.