This was the motive, which, as will appear as the story of our relations with Great Britain progresses, inspired the Foreign Secretary in all his dealings with the United States.  His purpose was to use the sea power of Great Britain to keep war materials and foodstuffs out of Germany, but never to go to the length of making an unbridgeable gulf between the United States and Great Britain.  The American Ambassador to Great Britain completely sympathized with this programme.  It was Page’s business to protect the rights of the United States, just as it was Grey’s to protect the rights of Great Britain.  Both were vigilant in protecting such rights, and animated differences between the two men on this point were not infrequent.  Great Britain did many absurd and high-handed things in intercepting American cargoes, and Page was always active in “protesting” when the basis for the protest actually existed.  But on the great overhanging issue the two men were at one.  Like Grey, Page believed that there were more important things involved than an occasional cargo of copper or of oil cake.  The American Ambassador thought that the United States should protect its shipping interests, but that it should realize that maritime law was not an exact science, that its principles had been modified by every great conflict in which the blockade had been an effective agency, and that the United States itself, in the Civil War, had not hesitated to make such changes as the changed methods of modern transportation had required.  In other words he believed that we could safeguard our rights in a way that would not prevent Great Britain from keeping war materials and foodstuffs out of Germany.  And like Sir Edward Grey, Page was obliged to contend with forces at home which maintained a contrary view.  In this early period Mr. Bryan was nominally Secretary of State, but the man who directed the national policy in shipping matters was Robert Lansing, then counsellor of the Department.  It is somewhat difficult to appraise Mr. Lansing justly, for in his conduct of his office there was not the slightest taint of malice.  His methods were tactless, the phrasing of his notes lacked deftness and courtesy, his literary style was crude and irritating; but Mr. Lansing was not anti-British, he was not pro-German; he was nothing more nor less than a lawyer.  The protection of American rights at sea was to him simply a “case” in which he had been retained as counsel for the plaintiff.  As a good lawyer it was his business to score as many points as possible for his client and the more weak joints he found in the enemy’s armour the better did he do his job.  It was his duty to scan the law books, to look up the precedents, to examine facts, and to prepare briefs that would be unassailable from a technical standpoint.  To Mr. Lansing this European conflict was the opportunity of a lifetime.  He had spent thirty years studying the intricate problems that now became his daily companions.  His mind