the criticism of having yielded to British pressure.  The inevitable effect would be to defeat the whole proceeding.  Colonel House therefore suggested that President Wilson be left to handle the matter in his own way and in his own time, and he assured the British statesman that the result would be satisfactory to both countries.  Sir Edward Grey at once saw that Colonel House’s statement of the matter was simply common sense, and expressed his willingness to leave the Panama matter in the President’s hands.

Thus, from July 3, 1913, there was a complete understanding between the British Government and the Washington Administration on the question of the tolls.  But neither the British nor the American public knew that President Wilson had pledged himself to a policy of repeal.  All during the summer and fall of 1913 this matter was as generally discussed in England as was Mexico.  Everywhere the Ambassador went—­country houses, London dinner tables, the colleges and the clubs—­he was constantly confronted with what was universally regarded as America’s great breach of faith.  How deeply he felt in the matter his letters show.

     To Edward M. House

     August 25, 1913.

     DEAR HOUSE: 

. . .  The English Government and the English people without regard to party—­I hear it and feel it everywhere—­are of one mind about this:  they think we have acted dishonourably.  They really think so—­it isn’t any mere political or diplomatic pretense.  We made a bargain, they say, and we have repudiated it.  If it were a mere bluff or game or party contention—­that would be one thing.  We could “bull” it through or live it down.  But they look upon it as we look upon the repudiation of a debt by a state.  Whatever the arguments by which the state may excuse itself, we never feel the same toward it—­never quite so safe about it.  They say, “You are a wonderful nation and a wonderful people.  We like you.  But your Government is not a government of honour.  Your honourable men do not seem to get control.”  You can’t measure the damage that this does us.  Whatever the United States may propose till this is fixed and forgotten will be regarded with a certain hesitancy.  They will not fully trust the honour of our Government.  They say, too, “See, you’ve preached arbitration and you propose peace agreements, and yet you will not arbitrate this:  you know you are wrong, and this attitude proves it.”  Whatever Mr. Hay might or could have done, he made a bargain.  The Senate ratified it.  We accepted it.  Whether it were a good bargain or a bad one, we ought to keep it.  The English feeling was shown just the other week when Senator Root received an honourary degree at Oxford.  The thing that gave him fame here was his speech on this treaty[49].  There is no end of ways in which they show their feeling and conviction.

Now, if in the next regular session the President takes a firm stand against the