more purely artificial argument) and Bryce’s brief reply, which did have the ring of sincerity in it.  The diplomatic correspondence in general seemed to me very dull stuff, and, after wading through it all day, on several nights as I went to bed the thought came to me whether this sort of activity were really worth a man’s while.”

Anything which affected British shipping adversely touched Great Britain in a sensitive spot; and Page had not been long in London before he perceived the acute nature of the Panama situation.  In July, 1913, Col.  Edward M. House reached the British capital.  A letter of Page’s to Sir Edward Grey gives such a succinct description of this new and influential force in American public life that it is worth quoting: 

     To Sir Edward Grey

     Coburg Hotel, London.

     [No date.]

     DEAR SIR EDWARD: 

There is an American gentleman in London, the like of whom I do not know.  Mr. Edward M. House is his name.  He is “the silent partner” of President Wilson—­that is to say, he is the most trusted political adviser and the nearest friend of the President.  He is a private citizen, a man without personal political ambition, a modest, quiet, even shy fellow.  He helps to make Cabinets, to shape policies, to select judges and ambassadors and suchlike merely for the pleasure of seeing that these tasks are well done.

     He is suffering from over-indulgence in advising, and he has come
     here to rest.  I cannot get him far outside his hotel, for he cares
     to see few people.  But he is very eager to meet you.

     I wonder if you would do me the honour to take luncheon at the
     Coburg Hotel with me, to meet him either on July 1, or 3, or 5—­if
     you happen to be free?  I shall have only you and Mr. House.

     Very sincerely yours,

     WALTER H. PAGE.

The chief reason why Colonel House wished to meet the British Foreign Secretary was to bring him a message from President Wilson on the subject of the Panama tolls.  The three men—­Sir Edward, Colonel House, and Mr. Page—­met at the suggested luncheon on July 3rd.  Colonel House informed the Foreign Secretary that President Wilson was now convinced that the Panama Act violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and that he intended to use all his influence to secure its repeal.  The matter, the American urged, was a difficult one, since it would be necessary to persuade Congress to pass a law acknowledging its mistake.  The best way in which Great Britain could aid in the process was by taking no public action.  If the British should keep protesting or discussing the subject acrimoniously in the press and Parliament, such a course would merely reenforce the elements that would certainly oppose the President.  Any protests would give them the opportunity to set up the cry of “British dictation,” and a change in the Washington policy would subject it to