. . . And, as for war with Mexico—I confess I’ve had a continually growing fear of it for six months. I’ve no confidence in the Mexican leaders—none of ’em. We shall have to Cuba-ize the country, which means thrashing ’em first—I fear, I fear, I fear; and I feel sorry for us all, the President in particular. It’s inexpressibly hard fortune for him. I can’t tell you with what eager fear we look for despatches every day and twice a day hurry to get the newspapers. All England believes we’ve got to fight it out.
Well, the English are with us, you see. Admiral Cradock, I understand, does not approve our policy, but he stands firmly with us whatever we do. The word to stand firmly with us has, I am very sure, been passed along the whole line—naval, newspaper, financial, diplomatic. Carden won’t give us any more trouble during the rest of his stay in Mexico. The yellow press’s abuse of the President and me has actually helped us here.
Heartily yours,
W.H.P.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 38: This was another manifestation of British friendliness. When the American excitement was most acute, it became known that British capitalists had secured oil concessions in Colombia. At the demand of the British Government they gave them up.]
[Footnote 39: Mr. Nelson O’Shaughnessy, Charge d’Affaires in Mexico.]
[Footnote 40: Mr. and Mrs. Francis B. Sayre.]
[Footnote 41: Colonel House succeeded in preventing it.]
[Footnote 42: Senator Augustus O. Bacon, of Georgia who was reported to nourish ill-feeling toward Page for his authorship of “The Southerner.”]
[Footnote 43: Probably an error for John Reed, at that time a newspaper correspondent in Mexico—afterward well known as a champion of the Bolshevist regime in Russia.]
CHAPTER VIII
HONOUR AND DISHONOUR IN PANAMA
In the early part of January, 1914, Colonel House wrote Page, asking whether he would consider favourably an offer to enter President Wilson’s Cabinet, as Secretary of Agriculture. Mr. David F. Houston, who was then most acceptably filling that position, was also an authority on banking and finance; the plan was to make him governor of the new Federal Reserve Board, then in process of formation, and to transfer Page to the vacant place in the Cabinet. The proposal was not carried through, but Page’s reply took the form of a review of his ambassadorship up to date, of his vexations, his embarrassments, his successes, and especially of the very important task which still lay before him. There were certain reasons, it will appear, why he would have liked to leave London; and there was one impelling reason why he preferred to stay. From the day of his arrival in England, Page had been humiliated, and his work had been constantly