If it is clear, then, that the study of history cannot be justified upon a purely utilitarian basis, we may pass to the consideration of other values that have been proposed.  The specialist in history, whose right to legislate upon this matter I have just called into question, will probably emphasize the disciplinary value of this study.  Specialists are commonly enthusiastic over the disciplinary value of their special subjects.  Their own minds have been so well developed by the pursuit of their special branches that they are impelled to recommend the same discipline for all minds.  Again, we must not blame the specialist in history, for you and I think the same about our own special type of activity.

From the disciplinary point of view, the study of history is supposed to give one the mastery of a special method of reasoning.  Historical method involves, above all else, the careful sifting of evidence, the minutest scrutiny of sources in order to judge whether or not the records are authentic, and the utmost care in coming to conclusions.  Now it will be generally agreed that these are desirable types of skill to possess whether one is an historian or a lawyer or a teacher or a man of business.  And yet, as in all types of discipline, the difficulty lies, not so much in acquiring the specific skill, as in transferring the skill thus acquired to other fields of activity.  Skill of any sort is made up of a multitude of little specific habits, and it is a current theory that habit functions effectively only in the specific situation in which it has been built up, or in situations closely similar.  But whether this is true or not it is obvious that the teaching of elementary history provides very few opportunities for this type of training.

A third view of the way in which historical knowledge is thought to work into action may be discussed under the head of the cultural value.  History, like literature, is commonly assumed to give to the individual who studies it, a certain amount of that commodity which the world calls culture.  Precisely what culture consists in, no one, apparently, is ready to tell us, but we all admit that it is real, if not tangible and definable, nor can we deny that the individual who possesses culture conducts himself, as a rule, differently from the individual who does not possess it.  In other words, culture is a practical thing, for the only things that are practical are the things that modify or control human action.

It is doubtless true that the study of history does add to this intangible something that we call “culture,” but the difficulty with this value lies in the fact that, even after we have accepted it as valid, we are in no way better off regarding our methods.  Like many other theories, its truth is not to be denied, but its truth gives us no inkling of a solution of our problem.  What we need is an educational value of history, the recognition of which will enable us to formulate a method for realizing the value.