The notion underlying this theory is probably true, but the theory itself can hardly stand.  Passing minor matters by, I would ask the reader to consider the following remarks. (a) If, as seems to be maintained, the spectator does not notice the indications of ’Short Time’ at all, how can they possibly affect him?  The passion, vehemence and haste of Othello affect him, because he perceives them; but if he does not perceive the hints which show the duration of the action from the arrival in Cyprus to the murder, these hints have simply no existence for him and are perfectly useless.  The theory, therefore, does not explain the existence of ‘Short Time.’ (b) It is not the case that ‘Short Time’ is wanted only to produce an impression of vehemence and haste, and ‘Long Time’ for probability.  The ‘Short Time’ is equally wanted for probability:  for it is grossly improbable that Iago’s intrigue should not break down if Othello spends a week or weeks between the successful temptation and his execution of justice. (c) And this brings me to the most important point, which appears to have escaped notice.  The place where ‘Long Time’ is wanted is not within Iago’s intrigue.  ‘Long Time’ is required simply and solely because the intrigue and its circumstances presuppose a marriage consummated, and an adultery possible, for (let us say) some weeks.  But, granted that lapse between the marriage and the temptation, there is no reason whatever why more than a few days or even one day should elapse between this temptation and the murder.  The whole trouble arises because the temptation begins on the morning after the consummated marriage.  Let some three weeks elapse between the first night at Cyprus and the temptation; let the brawl which ends in the disgrace of Cassio occur not on that night but three weeks later; or again let it occur that night, but let three weeks elapse before the intercession of Desdemona and the temptation of Iago begin.  All will then be clear.  Cassio has time to make acquaintance with Bianca, and to neglect her:  the Senate has time to hear of the perdition of the Turkish fleet and to recall Othello:  the accusations of Iago cease to be ridiculous; and the headlong speed of the action after the temptation has begun is quite in place.  Now, too, there is no reason why we should not be affected by the hints of time (’to-day,’ ‘to-night,’ ’even now’), which we do perceive (though we do not calculate them out).  And, lastly, this supposition corresponds with our natural impression, which is that the temptation and what follows it take place some little while after the marriage, but occupy, themselves, a very short time.

Now, of course, the supposition just described is no fact.  As the play stands, it is quite certain that there is no space of three weeks, or anything like it, either between the arrival in Cyprus and the brawl, or between the brawl and the temptation.  And I draw attention to the supposition chiefly to show that quite a small change would remove the difficulties, and to insist that there is nothing wrong at all in regard to the time from the temptation onward.  How to account for the existing contradictions I do not at all profess to know, and I will merely mention two possibilities.