=Human and Material Resources.=—­When we measure strength for strength in those signs of power—­men, money, and supplies—­it is difficult to see how the South was able to embark on secession and war with such confidence in the outcome.  In the Confederacy at the final reckoning there were eleven states in all, to be pitted against twenty-two; a population of nine millions, nearly one-half servile, to be pitted against twenty-two millions; a land without great industries to produce war supplies and without vast capital to furnish war finances, joined in battle with a nation already industrial and fortified by property worth eleven billion dollars.  Even after the Confederate Congress authorized conscription in 1862, Southern man power, measured in numbers, was wholly inadequate to uphold the independence which had been declared.  How, therefore, could the Confederacy hope to sustain itself against such a combination of men, money, and materials as the North could marshal?

=Southern Expectations.=—­The answer to this question is to be found in the ideas that prevailed among Southern leaders.  First of all, they hoped, in vain, to carry the Confederacy up to the Ohio River; and, with the aid of Missouri, to gain possession of the Mississippi Valley, the granary of the nation.  In the second place, they reckoned upon a large and continuous trade with Great Britain—­the exchange of cotton for war materials.  They likewise expected to receive recognition and open aid from European powers that looked with satisfaction upon the breakup of the great American republic.  In the third place, they believed that their control over several staples so essential to Northern industry would enable them to bring on an industrial crisis in the manufacturing states.  “I firmly believe,” wrote Senator Hammond, of South Carolina, in 1860, “that the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the world; that no other power would face us in hostility.  Cotton, rice, tobacco, and naval stores command the world; and we have the sense to know it and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry it out successfully.  The North without us would be a motherless calf, bleating about, and die of mange and starvation.”

There were other grounds for confidence.  Having seized all of the federal military and naval supplies in the South, and having left the national government weak in armed power during their possession of the presidency, Southern leaders looked to a swift war, if it came at all, to put the finishing stroke to independence.  “The greasy mechanics of the North,” it was repeatedly said, “will not fight.”  As to disparity in numbers they drew historic parallels.  “Our fathers, a mere handful, overcame the enormous power of Great Britain,” a saying of ex-President Tyler, ran current to reassure the doubtful.  Finally, and this point cannot be too strongly emphasized, the South expected to see a weakened and divided North.  It knew that the abolitionists and the Southern sympathizers were ready to let the Confederate states go in peace; that Lincoln represented only a little more than one-third the voters of the country; and that the vote for Douglas, Bell, and Breckinridge meant a decided opposition to the Republicans and their policies.