7.  Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion.  For aught we at present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required, even though all its acts are due to x.

8.  In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to x’, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will is of the nature of a First Cause.  In support of which possibility it may be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a causa causarum as regards x.

9.  To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes—­each the fons et origo of a new and never-ending stream of causality—­the cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of the streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53].

10.  Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in my essay on the ‘World as an Eject[54].’  But this, again, is merged in the mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and seemingly ultimate, fact.

11.  So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be—­pure agnosticism.

FOOTNOTES: 

[47] [Here it was intended to insert further explanation ’showing that mere observation of causality in external nature would not have yielded idea of anything further than time and space relations.’—­ED.]

[48] [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136, and ridiculed in the Candid Examination; see above, p. 11.  Romanes intended at this point to consider at greater length his old views ’on causation as due to being qua being.’—­ED.]

[49] See, however, Aubrey Moore in Lux Mundi, pp. 94-96, and Le Conte, Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought, pp. 335, ff. [N.B.  The references not enclosed in brackets are the author’s, not mine.—­ED.]

[50] [Nothing more however was written than what follows immediately.—­ED.]

[51] [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this theory and point out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his introduction after the term ‘invariably’ of the term ‘unconditionally’; he refers also to Martineau, Study of Religion, i. pp. 152, 3.—­ED.]

[52] [Romanes’ thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly expressed in an essay published subsequently to these Notes in Mind and Motion and Monism, pp. 129 ff.—­ED.]

[53] [See above, p. 31.—­ED.]

[54] Contemporary Review, July 1886. [But the ‘ultimate difficulty’ referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold dependent human wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing Will.—­ED.]