If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing or materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox persons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be at least as susceptible of the opposite view—­viz. that it is subsuming the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material:  and a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against either of these alternative points of view.  Or we may state the matter thus:  in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter, she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the material, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about natural causation—­even so much as its existence—­but for our own volitions.

Free Will[52].

Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical conclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:—­

1.  A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all, should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction between responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate.  No one questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question is touching responsibility as moral.  Yet the principal bulk of literature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both sides failing to perceive this basal distinction.  Even such able writers as Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.

2.  The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.  For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant foliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives from the former.

3.  Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation.  Now it can be proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically] unanswerable.  Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation x—­an unknown quantity.

4.  Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve itself into this—­is or is not the will determined by x?  And, if this seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the fact.  At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining—­viz.  Is the will self-determining, or is it determined—­i.e. from without?

5.  If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility?  And I think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.

6.  But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by natural causation (x)?  For the unknown quantity x may very well include x’, if by x’ we understand all the unknown ingredients of personality.