If we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the days of Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause of mechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence of their belief in special creation.  For I think it is unquestionable that, upon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate.  That is to say, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animals were originally introduced to the complex conditions of their several environments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches are turned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitled to assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligent purpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects.  It is, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previous belief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument from design, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning.  And it is, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact of evolution, as distinguished from special creation—­or of the gradual development of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their sudden and ready-made apparition—­would not in any way affect the argument from design, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admits the possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by the hypothesis of special creation.  But this is precisely what is shown by the theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin.  That is to say, the theory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded by Darwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development as distinguished from sudden creation.  It is this, but it is also a theory of a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physical causes of that development.  And this is the point where natural science begins to exert her influence upon natural theology—­or the point where the theory of evolution begins to affect the theory of design.  As this is a most important part of our subject, and one upon which an extraordinary amount of confusion at the present time prevails, I shall in my next paper carefully consider it in all its bearings.

FOOTNOTES: 

[19] [The third paper is not published because Romanes’ views on the relation between science and faith in Revealed Religion are better and more maturely expressed in the Notes.—­ED.]

[20] To avoid misunderstanding I may observe that in the above definitions I am considering Religion and Science under the conditions in which they actually exist.  It is conceivable that under other conditions these two departments of thought might not be so sharply separated.  Thus, for instance, if a Religion were to appear carrying a revelation to Science upon matters of physical causation, such a Religion (supposing the revelation were found by experiment to be true) ought to be held to exercise upon Science a strictly legitimate influence.