effects contemplated), through polytheism (wherein many effects of a like kind were referred to one deity, who, as it were, took special charge over that class), up to monotheism (wherein all causation is gathered up into the monopsychism of a single personality):  it is enough thus briefly to show that from first to last the hypothesis of anthropopsychism is a necessary phase of mental evolution under existing conditions, and this whether or not the hypothesis is true.

Thus viewed, I do not think that ‘the general consent of mankind’ is a fact of any argumentative weight in favour of the anthropopsychic theory—­so far, I mean, as the matter of causation is concerned—­whether this be in fetishism or in the teleology of our own day:  the general consent of mankind in the larger question of theism (where sundry other matters besides causation fail to be considered) does not here concern us.  Indeed, it appears to me that if we are to go back to the savages for any guarantee of our anthropopsychic theory, the pledge which we receive is of worse than no value.  As well might we conclude that a match is a living organism, because this is to the mind of a savage the most obvious explanation of its movements, as conclude on precisely similar grounds that our belief in teleology derives any real support from any of the more primitive phases of anthropopsychism.

It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to estimate the evidence of design in Nature, we must as it were start de novo, without reference to anterior beliefs upon the subject.  The question is essentially one to be considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess, and by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all the ages) are able to bring to bear upon it.  I shall, therefore, only allude to the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessary to do so for the sake of elucidating my argument.

And here it is needful to consider first what Paley called ’the state of the argument’ before the Darwinian epoch.  This is clearly and tersely presented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upon a heath—­an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it.  I will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one’s watch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is not in my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Mill where he says,—­’The inference would not be from marks of design, but because I already know by direct experience that watches are made by men.’  This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley’s meaning, for there would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood to mean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded by examination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examination only, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill.  For the purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that the finder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching the manufacture of watches.  Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Mill was at one with Paley upon the whole subject.