But by thus giving Humanity the name of Deity we are not really creating a new religion:  we are merely using a metaphor, which may or may not be successful as a matter of poetic diction, but which most assuredly presents no shred of value as a matter of philosophical statement.  Indeed, in this relation it is worse than valueless:  it is misleading.  Variations or reversals in the meanings of words are not of uncommon occurrence in the ordinary growth of languages; but it is not often that we find, as in this case, the whole meaning of a term intentionally and gratuitously changed by the leaders of philosophical thought.  Humanity, for example, is an abstract idea of our own making:  it is not an object any more than the equator is an object.  Therefore, if it were possible to construct a religion by this curious device of metaphorically ascribing to Humanity the attributes of Deity, it ought to be as logically possible to construct, let us say, a theory of brotherly regard towards the equator, by metaphorically ascribing to it the attributes of man.  The distinguishing features of any theory which can properly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimate source, or sources, of things:  and that it should suppose this source to be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature.  To apply the term Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it.

From these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods of Science are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof of the proximate How of things and processes physical:  her problem is, as Mill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal) data which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience.  On the other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation, further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately due to intelligent personality.  Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says, ’an a priori theory of the universe’—­to which, however, we must add, ’and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating source of the universe.’  Without this needful addition, a religion would be in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.

From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest forms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.  Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of phenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could Science be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.  But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.  In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether of noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such an atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement.  Out of time, out of place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist as such.

On the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent to affect Science.  For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is not concerned with the phenomenal sphere:  her theory of ontology cannot have any reference to the How of phenomenal causation.  Hence it is evident that, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in different mental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference.