Now that Caecina and Valens had joined forces, the Vitellians had no longer any reason to avoid a decisive battle.  Otho accordingly held a council to decide whether they should prolong the war or put their fortune to the test.  Suetonius Paulinus, who was considered the 32 most experienced general of his day,[283] now felt it was due to his reputation to deliver his views on the general conduct of the war.  His contention was that the enemy’s interests were best served by haste, Otho’s by delay.  He argued thus:  ‘The whole of Vitellius’ force has now arrived and he has few reinforcements in his rear, for the Gallic provinces are in a ferment, and it would be fatal to abandon the Rhine with all those hostile tribes ready to swarm across it.  The troops in Britain are busy with their own foes and cut off by the sea:  the Spanish provinces can scarcely spare any troops:  the Narbonese are seriously alarmed by their recent reverse and the inroads of our fleet.  The country across the Po is shut in by the Alps and denied all supplies by sea,[284] and, besides, its resources have been already exhausted by the passage of their army.  Nowhere can they get supplies, and without commissariat no army can be kept together.  The German troops are their strongest fighting arm, but their constitutions will not be strong enough to stand the change of weather, if we protract the war into the summer.  It has often happened that a force, which seemed irresistible at first, has dwindled to nothing through the tedium of forced inaction.

’On the other hand, our resources are rich and reliable.  We have on our side Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, and the East; the armies there are fresh and strong; we have Italy and Rome, the Queen of the World, and the Roman Senate and People:  those titles always mean something, though their glory may sometimes be obscured.  We have large public and private resources, and in civil war a vast quantity of money is stronger than the sword.  Our soldiers are inured to the Italian climate or, at any rate, to heat.  We are entrenched behind the Po:[285] its cities are protected by strong walls and willing hands, and the defence of Placentia has shown that none of them will yield to the enemy.’  Therefore Otho must remain on the defensive.  In a few days the Fourteenth legion would arrive:  its fame alone was great, and the Moesian forces[286] would be with it.  He should, at any rate, postpone his deliberations until then, and fight, if fight he must, with augmented strength.

Marius Celsus supported Paulinus.  Annius Gallus had been hurt a 33 few days before by a fall from his horse, but messengers were sent to inquire his views, and they reported that he too agreed.  Otho inclined to a decisive engagement.  His brother Titianus and Proculus, the prefect of the Guard, with all the impatience of inexperience, stoutly maintained that fortune and Providence, and Otho’s own good genius inspired his policy, and would inspire its