The moralist inquires whether art is either good in itself or a means to good.  Before answering, we will ask what he means by the word “good,” not because it is in the least doubtful, but to make him think.  In fact, Mr. G.E.  Moore has shown pretty conclusively in his Principia Ethica that by “good” everyone means just good.  We all know quite well what we mean though we cannot define it.  “Good” can no more be defined than “Red”:  no quality can be defined.  Nevertheless we know perfectly well what we mean when we say that a thing is “good” or “red.”  This is so obviously true that its statement has greatly disconcerted, not to say enraged, the orthodox philosophers.

Orthodox philosophers are by no means agreed as to what we do mean by “good,” only they are sure that we cannot mean what we say.  They used to be fond of assuming that “good” meant pleasure; or, at any rate, that pleasure was the sole good as an end:  two very different propositions.  That “good” means “pleasure” and that pleasure is the sole good was the opinion of the Hedonists, and is still the opinion of any Utilitarians who may have lingered on into the twentieth century.  They enjoy the honour of being the only ethical fallacies worth the powder and shot of a writer on art.  I can imagine no more delicate or convincing piece of logic than that by which Mr. G.E.  Moore disposes of both.  But it is none of my business to do clumsily what Mr. Moore has done exquisitely.  I have no mind by attempting to reproduce his dialectic to incur the merited ridicule of those familiar with the Principia Ethica or to spoil the pleasure of those who will be wise enough to run out this very minute and order a masterpiece with which they happen to be unacquainted.  For my immediate purpose it is necessary only to borrow one shaft from that well-stocked armoury.

To him who believes that pleasure is the sole good, I will put this question:  Does he, like John Stuart Mill, and everyone else I ever heard of, speak of “higher and lower” or “better and worse” or “superior and inferior” pleasures?  And, if so, does he not perceive that he has given away his case?  For, when he says that one pleasure is “higher” or “better” than another, he does not mean that it is greater in quantity but superior in quality.

On page 7 of Utilitarianism, J.S.  Mill says:—­

“If one of the two (pleasures) is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.”

But if pleasure be the sole good, the only possible criterion of pleasures is quantity of pleasure.