commission, which were far short of the ideal number named by Nelson.  It may be believed, or at least hoped, that if forced to choose between the two, as St. Vincent was, his choice would have been that of the great Earl.  It seems clear, however, that in 1804 he believed it possible that the Army of Invasion might get as far as the shores of England—­a question which has been much argued.  “I am very uneasy,” he then wrote to Lady Hamilton, “at your and Horatia being on the coast:  for you cannot move, if the French make the attempt.”

Whatever weight may be attributed to this criticism on Nelson’s hastily sketched scheme, there can scarcely be any discord in the note of admiration for the fire that begins to glow, the instant he in thought draws near the enemy.  There, assuredly, is no uncertain sound.  They must be met as soon as possible; if not strong enough to attack, they must be watched, and company kept, till a favorable opportunity offers.  If none occur till they draw near the beach, then, “Whatever plans may be adopted, the moment they touch our coast, be it where it may, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and on shore:  this must be perfectly understood.  Never fear the event.”  The resolution shown by such words is not born of carelessness; and the man who approaches his work in their spirit will wring success out of many mistakes of calculation—­unless indeed he stumble on an enemy of equal determination.  The insistence upon keeping the enemy under observation, “keeping company” with them, however superior in numbers, may also be profitably noted.  This inspired his whole purpose, four years later, in the pursuit of the French to the West Indies—­if the odds are too great for immediate attack, “We won’t part without a battle.”  It was the failure to hold the same principle of action, applicable to such diverse cases, that ruined Calder in the same campaign.

With the general views that have been outlined, Nelson hastened to his task.  His commission for the new service was dated July 24, three weeks after his return from the Baltic.  On the 25th he presented the memorandum of operations which has been discussed, on the 26th the Admiralty issued their instructions, and on the 27th he hoisted his flag upon the “Unite” frigate at Sheerness.  “I shall go on board this day,” he said, “in order to show we must all get to our posts as speedily as possible.”  His orders, after mentioning the general reason for creating the “Squadron on a Particular Service,” as his command was officially styled, designated the limits of his charge, coastwise, as from Orfordness, on the Suffolk shore, round to Beachy Head, on the Channel.  On the enemy’s side of the water, it extended from end to end of the line of ports from which the especial danger of an invasion by troops might be supposed to issue—­from Dieppe to Ostend; but the mouth of the Scheldt was implicitly included.