To frustrate that part of this combined effort which is supposed to be directed against the Channel coast, Nelson proposes that, “if it is calm when the enemy row out, all our vessels and boats appointed to watch them, must get into the Channel, and meet them as soon as possible; if not strong enough for the attack, they must watch, and keep them company till a favourable opportunity offers.  Should it remain calm,” so that the cruising ships cannot assist, “the moment that they begin to touch our shore, strong or weak, our flotilla of boats must attack as much of the enemy’s flotilla as they are able—­say only one half or two thirds—­it will create a most powerful diversion, for the bows of our flotilla will be opposed to their unarmed sterns.”

The dispositions to defend the entrance of the Thames, being considered the more important, are the more minute.  Blockships are stationed in the principal channels, as floating fortifications, commanding absolutely the water around them, and forming strong points of support for the flotilla.  It is sagaciously ordered that these “are not, from any apparent advantage, to be moved, for the tide may prevent their resuming the very important stations assigned them.”  Nelson was evidently alive to that advantage in permanent works, which puts it out of the power of panic to stampede them; tide is not the only factor that prevents retrieving a false step.  The eastern flotilla is organized into three bodies, the right wing being near Margate, the left in Hollesley Bay near Harwich, the centre, vaguely, between Orfordness and the North Foreland.  When the alarm is given, they are to draw together towards the centre, but not to emphasize their movement sufficiently to uncover either flank, until the enemy’s flotilla can be seen; then they are “to unite, but not intermix.”

To both divisions—­that in the Channel and that on’ the East Coast—­the commander-in-chief, in concluding, renews his charge, with one of those “Nelson touches” which electrified his followers:  “Whatever plans may be adopted, the moment the enemy touch our coast, be it where it may, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and on shore:  this must be perfectly understood. Never fear the event.”

This plan for the defence of London against an attack by surprise, drawn up by Nelson on the spur of the moment, was based simply upon his general ideas, and without specific information yet as to either the character or extent of the enemy’s preparations, or of the means of resistance available on his own side.  It has, therefore, something of an abstract character, embodying broad views unmodified by special circumstances, and possessing, consequently, a somewhat peculiar value in indicating the tendency of Nelson’s military conceptions.  He assumes, implicitly, a certain freedom of movement on the part of the two opponents, unrestricted by the friction and uncertainty which in practice fetter action; and the use which, under these conditions, he imagines either will make of his powers, may not unfairly be assumed to show what he thought the correct course in such a general case.