a most formidable and unprovoked Coalition against Great Britain.”  For the second, he said that the only foundation, upon which Sir Hyde Parker could rest his justification for not proceeding to bombardment, would be the total suspension of the treaties with Russia for a fixed time, and the free use of Danish ports and supplies by the British fleet.  These two concessions, it will be observed, by neutralizing Denmark, would remove the threat to British communications, and convert Denmark into an advanced base of operations for the fleet.  Nelson did not have great hope of success in negotiating, for he observed that fear of Russia, not desire for war, was controlling the Prince.  Therefore, had he been commander-in-chief, he would at all risks have pushed on to Revel, and struck the coalition to the heart there.  “I make no scruple,” he wrote to St. Vincent after he had procured the armistice, “in saying that I would have been at Revel fourteen days ago.  No man but those on the spot can tell what I have gone through, and do suffer.  I wanted Sir Hyde to let me at least go and cruise off Carlscrona, [where the Swedish fleet was,] to prevent the Revel ships getting in.  Think of me, my dear Lord, and if I have deserved well, let me retire; if ill, for heaven’s sake supersede me, for I cannot exist in this state.”  Pegasus was indeed shackled.

The truce was continued from day to day, both sides preparing to renew hostilities, while the negotiators sat.  Discussing thus, sword in hand, Nelson frankly told the other side that he wanted an armistice for sixteen weeks, to give him time to act against the Russian fleet, and then to return to Denmark.  On the likely supposition that the latter would not greatly grieve over a Russian disaster, this openness was probably discreet.  In the wrangling that preceded consent, one of the Danes hinted, in French, at a renewal of hostilities.  “Renew hostilities!” said Nelson, who understood the language, but could not speak it, “tell him that we are ready at this moment; ready to bombard this very night.”  But, while he thus could use on occasion the haughty language of one at whose back stood a victorious fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line, “the best negotiators in Europe,” to repeat his own words, his general bearing was eminently conciliatory, as became one who really longed for peace in the particular instance, and was alive to the mingled horror and inutility of the next move open to Great Britain, under Parker’s policy,—­the bombardment of Copenhagen.  “Whoever may be the respective Ministers who shall sign the peace,” wrote to him Count Waltersdorff, who with Lindholm conducted the Danish case and signed the armistice, “I shall always consider your lordship as the Pacificator of the North, and I am sure that your heart will be as much flattered by that title, as by any other which your grateful Country has bestowed upon you.”