of a truce.  On the score of humanity he had consented to a cessation of hostilities, conditional upon his freedom to take out of the surrendered ships the unwounded prisoners, and to remove the prizes.  If the bargain was more to his advantage than to that of the Danes—­which is a matter of opinion—­it was none the less a bargain, of which he had full right to reap the benefit.  The Danes did not then charge him with taking an unfair advantage.  On the contrary, Lindholm, who was closely cognizant of all that passed in relation to these negotiations, wrote to him:  “Your Lordship’s motives for sending a flag of truce to our Government can never be misconstrued, and your subsequent conduct has sufficiently shown that humanity is always the companion of true valour.”  The truce that then began was prolonged from day to day till April 9th.  During it both parties went on with their preparations for war.  “These few days,” wrote Niebuhr, on the 6th, “have certainly been employed in repairing the evil [of faulty preparation] as far as possible.”  It is clear that the Danes understood, what Nelson’s message specified, a cessation of direct hostilities, not of other movements.  The British during the same days were putting bomb-vessels in place, a perfectly overt act.

Nelson’s success at Copenhagen was secured by address, as it had been won by force.  But it had been thoroughly won.  “We cannot deny it,” wrote Niebuhr, “we are quite beaten.  Our line of defence is destroyed.  We cannot do much injury to the enemy, as long as he contents himself with bombarding the city, docks, and fleet.  The worst is the Crown Batteries can be held no longer.”  Two or three days later he says again:  “The truce has been prolonged.  The remaining half of our defences are useless, now that the right wing is broken,—­a defect over which I have meditated uselessly many a time since last summer.”  The result was due to Nelson’s sagacious and emphatic advice as to the direction and manner of the attack, by which the strong points of the Danish positions were completely and unexpectedly turned.  This plan, it is credibly stated, he had formed before leaving England, although he was not formally consulted by Parker until the 23d of March.

Having regard to the general political conditions, and especially to the great combination of the North at this time directed against Great Britain, the victory of Copenhagen was second in importance to none that Nelson ever gained; while in the severity of the resistance, and in the attendant difficulties to be overcome, the battle itself was the most critical of all in which he was engaged.  So conspicuous were the energy and sagacity shown by him, that most seamen will agree in the opinion of Jurien de la Graviere:  “They will always be in the eyes of seamen his fairest title to glory.  He alone was capable of displaying such boldness and perseverance; he alone could confront the immense difficulties of that enterprise