them in an interval.  By this arrangement, each of the British was covered in its advance, until it reached its prescribed antagonist as nearly fresh as possible, and the order of the British column was reversed from end to end.[31] A division of frigates and fireships, under Captain Riou, was held ready for any special service.  The bomb-vessels were to anchor in the King’s Channel, but well outside the line of battle, from which position they threw some bombs.  Alongside each ship-of-the-line was towed a flat-boat, intended to carry soldiers in an attempt to storm the Trekroner, if circumstances favored; and other boats were sent for that purpose from Parker’s division.

These orders were copied, and ready for distribution, by six in the morning.  Nelson, who was already up and had breakfasted, signalled at seven for all captains, and by eight these had their instructions.  The wind had become so fair that ships anchoring by the stern would lie perfectly well for using their broadsides at once.  At this instant indecision appeared among the pilots, who were mostly men of only a little local experience, and that gained in vessels much smaller than those they were now to conduct.  Nelson, reverting afterwards to these moments, said:  “I experienced in the Sound the misery of having the honour of our Country intrusted to pilots, who have no other thought than to keep the ship clear of danger, and their own silly heads clear of shot.  At eight in the morning of the 2d of April, not one pilot would take charge of a ship.”  There is in these words scarcely fair allowance for the men’s ignorance.  At length one of the Masters of the fleet, a Mr. Brierley, undertook to lead the column, and the signal to weigh in succession was made.  The leading ship got off handsomely, but difficulties soon arose.  Nelson’s old “Agamemnon” was so anchored that she could not weather the Middle Ground; she consequently did not get into action at all.  Two other ships, the “Bellona” and “Russell,” seventy-fours, grounded on the east side of the Middle Ground, where they remained fast.  Although they could use their guns, and did use them against those southern ships which Nelson particularly wanted crushed, the disadvantages of distance, of position, and of general helplessness, detracted exceedingly from their usefulness.  The valid British force was thus reduced by one-fourth,—­to nine vessels.

Nelson’s ship, the “Elephant,” was following the “Bellona” and “Russell,” and he saw them ground.  “His agitation during these moments was extreme,” says an eye-witness.  “I shall never forget the impression it made on me.  It was not, however, the agitation of indecision, but of ardent, animated patriotism panting for glory, which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from his grasp.”  He doubtless well knew the thinly veiled reproaches of rashness, cast by timid counsels upon the daring, which even under these disadvantages was to cover with confusion