The northern part of this defence was decisively the stronger.  To attack there, Nelson called “taking the bull by the horns.”  The southern wing was much more exposed.  Nor was this all.  An advance from the north must be made with a northerly wind.  If unsuccessful, or even, in case of success, if ships were badly crippled, they could not return to the north, where the fleet was.  On the other hand, attack from the south presupposed a southerly wind, with which, after an action, the engaged ships could rejoin the fleet, if they threaded safely the difficult navigation.  In any event there was risk, but none knew better than Nelson that without risks war is not made.  To the considerations above given he added that, when south of the city, the British would be interposed between the other Baltic navies and Denmark.  The latter, in that case, could not receive reinforcements, unless the English squadron were first defeated.  He therefore proposed that ten ships-of-the-line, of the lighter draughts, which he offered himself to lead, should pass through the outer, or northern channel, gain the southern flank of the defence, and thence make the principal attack, while the rest of the fleet supported them by a demonstration against the northern end.  The sagacity of this scheme is best attested from the enemy himself.  “We have been deceived in the plan of attack,” wrote the historian Niebuhr, then residing in the city; “and,” now that the right wing of the defence is destroyed, “all is at stake.”  The nights of the 30th and 31st were employed in surveying the waters, laying down buoys to replace those removed by the Danes, and in further reconnoissance of the enemy’s position.  The artillery officers who were to supervise the bombardment satisfied themselves that, if the floating defences south of the Trekroner were destroyed, the bomb-vessels could be placed in such a position as to shell the city, without being themselves exposed to undue peril.

Parker gave Nelson twelve ships-of-the-line, two more than he had asked; a judicious addition, for the main part of the fighting was to fall to him, and the difficulties of pilotage might, and actually did, deprive him of several ships.  Moreover, while it was proposed that the vessels remaining with Parker should approach and engage the northern defences, yet the time of attack depended upon a fair wind for Nelson; and as that would necessarily be foul for the other body, the diversion made by it might be, and proved to be, ineffective.  Sound judgment dictated giving Nelson all that could be spared.

On the afternoon of the 31st another council was held, in which Nelson’s plan was finally ratified; he again volunteered his services, which were accepted and his force detailed.  As usual, the council was prolific in suggestions of danger.  Stewart, who seems to have been present, writes:  “During this Council of War, the energy of Lord Nelson’s character was remarked:  certain difficulties had