by immediate steps against Russia.  Only such a bold spirit, with the prestige of a Nelson, can dominate a council of war, or extort decisive action from a commander-in-chief who calls one.  “The difficulty,” wrote Nelson some time afterwards, “was to get our commander-in-chief to either go past Cronenburg or through the Belt [that is, by any passage], because, what Sir Hyde thought best, and what I believe was settled before I came on board the London, was to stay in the Cattegat, and there wait the time when the whole naval force of the Baltic might choose to come out and fight—­a measure, in my opinion, disgraceful to our Country.  I wanted to get at an enemy as soon as possible to strike a home stroke, and Paul was the enemy most vulnerable, and of the greatest consequence for us to humble.”  So pressing, daring, and outspoken were his counsels, so freely did he now, as at former times, advocate setting aside the orders of distant superiors, that he thought advisable to ask Vansittart, who was to sail immediately for England, to explain to the Admiralty all the conditions and reasons, which Vansittart did.  St. Vincent, as First Lord, gave unhesitating approval to what his former lieutenant had advised.

Nelson’s understanding of the situation was, in truth, acute, profound, and decisive.  In the northern combination against Great Britain, Paul was the trunk, Denmark and Sweden the branches.  Could he get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches fell with it; but should time and strength first be spent lopping off the branches, the trunk would remain, and “my power must be weaker when its greatest strength is required.”  As things then were, the Russian Navy was divided, part being in Cronstadt, and a large fraction, twelve ships-of-the-line, in Revel, an advanced and exposed port, where it was detained fettered by the winter’s ice.  Get at that and smite it, and the Russian Navy is disabled; all falls together.  This would be his own course, if independent.  As Parker, however, was obstinately resolved not to leave Denmark hostile in his rear, Nelson had to bend to the will of his superior.  He did so, without forsaking his own purpose.  As in the diverse objects of his care in the Mediterranean, where he could not compel, he sought diligently to compass his object by persuasion, by clear and full explanation of his lofty views, by stirring appeals to duty and opportunity, striving to impart to another his own insight, and to arouse in him his own single-minded and dauntless activity.  Conceding, perforce, that Denmark was not to be left hostile in the rear,—­although he indicates that this object might be attained by masking her power with a detachment, while the main effort was immediately directed against Revel,—­his suggestions to Parker for reducing Denmark speedily are dominated by the same conception.  Strategic and tactical considerations unite to dictate, that the fleet, whether it go by the Sound or the Belt, must quickly reach and hold a position beyond—­and therefore in the rear of—­Copenhagen.  There it interposed between Denmark and Russia; from there it approached Copenhagen where its defences were weakest.  This comprehensive exposition went, with Nelson’s customary directness, straight to the root of the matter.