The French and Spanish fleets, being neither a homogeneous nor a well-exercised mass, experienced even greater difficulty than the British in forming their array; and the matter was to them of more consequence, for, as the defensive has an advantage in the careful preparations he may make, so, if he fail to accomplish them, he has little to compensate for the loss of the initiative, which he has yielded his opponent.  The formation at which they aimed, the customary order of battle in that day, was a long, straight, single column, presenting from end to end an unbroken succession of batteries, close to one another and clear towards the foe, so that all the ships should sweep with their guns the sea over which, nearly at right angles, the hostile columns were advancing.  Instead of this, embarrassed by both lack of wind and lack of skill, their manoeuvres resulted in a curved line, concave to the enemy’s approach; the horns of the crescent thus formed being nearer to the latter.  Collingwood noted that this disposition facilitated a convergent fire upon the assailants, the heads of whose columns were bearing down on the allied centre; it does not seem to have been remarked that the two horns, or wings, being to windward of the centre, also had it more in their power to support the latter—­a consideration of very great importance.  Neither of these advantages, however, was due to contrivance.  The order of the combined fleets was the result merely of an unsuccessful effort to assume the usual line of battle.  The ships distributed along the crescent lay irregularly, sometimes two and three abreast, masking each other’s fire.  On the other hand, even this irregularity had some compensations, for a British vessel, attempting to pass through at such a place, fell at once into a swarm of enemies.  From horn to horn was about five miles.  Owing to the lightness of the breeze, the allies carried a good deal of sail, a departure from the usual battle practice.  This was necessary in order to enable them to keep their places at all, but it also had the effect of bringing them continually, though very gradually, nearer to Cadiz.  Seeing this, Nelson signalled to Collingwood, “I intend to pass through the van of the enemy’s line, to prevent him from getting into Cadiz,” and the course of the “Victory,” for this purpose, was changed a little to the northward.

After this, towards eleven o’clock, Nelson went below to the cabin.  It was his habit, when an engagement was expected, to have all the bulkheads[139] upon the fighting decks taken down, and those of his own apartments doubtless had been removed at least as soon as the enemy’s sailing was signalled; but it was possible to obtain some degree of privacy by hanging screens, which could be hurried out of the way at the last moment.  The “Victory” did not come under fire till 12.30, so that at eleven she would yet be three miles or more distant from the enemy,[140] and screens could still remain.