In a general sense, then, it may be said that, when daylight showed the enemies to each other, the British fleet was heading to the northward, and that of the allies to the southward; the latter being ten or twelve miles east of their opponents.  In the far distance, Cape Trafalgar, from which the battle takes its name, was just visible against the eastern sky.  At twenty minutes before seven Nelson made in quick succession the signals, “To form the order of sailing,”—­which by his previous instructions was to be the order of battle,—­and “To prepare for battle.”  Ten minutes later followed the command to “Bear up,” the “Victory” setting the example by at once altering her course for the enemy.  Collingwood did the same, and the ships of the two divisions fell into the wake of their leaders as best they could, for the light wind afforded neither the means nor the time for refinements in manoeuvring.  Fourteen ships followed the “Royal Sovereign,” which bore Collingwood’s flag, while the remaining twelve gathered in Nelson’s division behind the “Victory."[134] The two columns steered east, about a mile apart, that of Nelson being to the northward; from which circumstance, the wind being west-northwest, it has been called commonly the weather line.

Thus, as Ivanhoe, at the instant of encounter in the lists, shifted his lance from the shield to the casque of the Templar, Nelson, at the moment of engaging, changed the details of his plan, and substituted an attack in two columns, simultaneously made, for the charge of Collingwood’s division, in line and in superior numbers, upon the enemy’s flank; to be followed, more or less quickly, according to indications, by such movement of his own division as might seem advisable.  It will be observed, however, that the order of sailing remained the order of battle,—­probably, although it is not so stated, the fleet was already thus disposed when the signal was made, needing only rectification after the derangements incident to darkness,—­and further, that the general direction of attack continued the same, Collingwood guiding his column upon the enemy’s southern flank, while Nelson pointed a few ships north of their centre.  In this way was preserved the comprehensive aim which underlay the particular dispositions of his famous order:  “The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two or three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their fleet.”  The northern flank of the allies—­ten or a dozen ships—­was consequently left unengaged, unless by their own initiative they came promptly into action; which, it may be added, they did not do until after the battle was decided.