The attack as planned, therefore, differed from that executed (1) in that the lee line was not to advance in column, but in line, thereby dispersing the enemy’s fire, and avoiding the terrific concentration which crushed the leaders at Trafalgar; and (2) in that the weather squadrons were not to attack simultaneously with the lee, but after it had engaged, in order to permit the remedying of any mishap that might arise in delivering the crucial blow.  In both these matters of detail the plan was better than the modification; but the latter was forced upon Nelson by conditions beyond his control.

It will be observed that, when considering attacking from to leeward, he orders a simultaneous movement of the three British divisions,—­lee, weather, and reserve; for the obvious reason that if he held his own divisions in reserve to leeward he could not at all count upon bringing them into action at will; and, moreover, such an attack would probably have to be in columns, and, if simultaneous, would be less liable to disaster than in succession, mutual support diverting the enemies’ fire.  In fact, the highest order of offensive combination was only possible when having the advantage of the wind—­fair, and enough of it.

The plan upon which Trafalgar was to be fought, as above described and analyzed, was formed some time before leaving England, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was in fact a modification of the earlier idea, laid down during the chase to the West Indies.  On the 10th of September, three days only before quitting Merton, Nelson called upon his old friend, Lord Sidmouth,[127] who until recently had been Prime Minister.  In the course of the interview he explained his intentions as regards the attack.  “Rodney,” he said, “broke the enemy’s line in one place,[128] I will break it in two;” and with his finger he indicated upon a table the general character of the assault, to be made in two lines, led by himself and Collingwood.  He felt confident, according to Sidmouth’s narration, that he should capture either their van and centre or their centre and rear.  It was of course out of his power to prevent the enemy inverting their order, by the simultaneous turning round of every ship, at the time of engagement, so that the attack intended for the rear should fall upon it become the van.  Against this contingency he provided by the words, “should the enemy wear together, still the twelve ships composing, in the first position, the enemy’s rear, are to be the object of attack of the lee line.”  Sidmouth did not commit his recollection of this incident to writing until many years later, and, not being a seaman, very likely failed to comprehend some of the details—­there seems to the author to be in the story a confusion of what Nelson planned with what Nelson did; but a great conception is largely independent of details, and the essential features of Trafalgar are in Sidmouth’s account.  The idea was doubtless imparted also