The second of these Orders, that of October 9, is memorable, not only for the sagacity and comprehensiveness of its general dispositions, but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details of execution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall.  It was evidently drawn up in the first instance for Collingwood only; the word “your” in the original draught having been struck out, and “second in command” substituted.  The comparison already made between it and its predecessor of May, may not uninstructively be followed by a study of the difference in details between itself and the execution it actually received at the Battle of Trafalgar.  To aid this purpose the author has traced, in marginal notes, the succession of the leading ideas.

After a statement of General Considerations, and a frank attribution of full powers to the second in command for carrying out his part, Nelson lays down the manner of Attack from to Leeward.  This condition not obtaining at Trafalgar, the plan cannot be contrasted with the performance of that day.  Upon this follows a luminous enunciation of the general idea, namely, Collingwood’s engaging the twelve rear ships, which underlies the method prescribed for each attack—­from to leeward and to windward.  Of the latter Nelson fortunately gives an outline diagram, which illustrates the picture before his own mind, facilitating our comprehension of his probable expectations, and allowing a comparison between them and the event as it actually occurred.  It is not to the discredit, but greatly to the credit, of his conception, that it was susceptible of large modification in practice while retaining its characteristic idea.

Looking at his diagram,[126] and following his words, it will be seen that the British lines are not formed perpendicularly to that of the enemy (as they were at Trafalgar), but parallel to it.  Starting from this disposition, near the enemy and abreast his centre, the lee line of sixteen ships was to bear up together, and advance in line, not in column (as happened at Trafalgar); their object being the twelve rear ships of the enemy.  This first move stands by itself; the action of the weather line, and of the reserve squadron still farther to windward, are held in suspense under the eye of the commander-in-chief, to take the direction which the latter shall prescribe as the struggle develops.  The mere menace of such a force, just out of gunshot to windward, would be sufficient to prevent any extensive manoeuvre of the unengaged enemies.  Nelson doubtless had in mind the dispositions, more than a century old, of Tourville and De Ruyter, by which a few ships, spaced to windward of an enemy’s van, could check its tacking, because of the raking fire to which they would subject it.  Unquestionably, he would not have kept long in idle expectancy twenty-four ships, the number he had in mind; but clearly also he proposed to hold them until he saw how things went with Collingwood.  Thus much time would allow, granting the position he assumed and a reasonable breeze.  His twenty-four to windward held an absolute check over the supposed thirty-four unengaged, of the enemy.