Nelson received word from some of his lookouts appointed to meet him here, that nothing had been heard of the allied squadrons.  The anxiety which had never ceased to attend him was increased by this prolonged silence.  He had no certainty that the enemy might not have doubled back, and gone to Jamaica.  He would not stop now to exchange with Collingwood speculations about the enemy’s course.  “My dear Collingwood, I am, as you may suppose, miserable at not having fallen in with the enemy’s fleet; and I am almost increased in sorrow by not finding them [here].  The name of General Brereton will not soon be forgot.  I must now only hope that the enemy have not tricked me, and gone to Jamaica; but if the account,[107] of which I send you a copy, is correct, it is more than probable that they are either gone to the northward, or, if bound to the Mediterranean, not yet arrived.”  His surmise remains accurate.  He then continues, with that delicate and respectful recognition of the position and ability of others, which won him so much love:  “The moment the fleet is watered, and got some refreshments, of which we are in great want, I shall come out and make you a visit; not, my dear friend, to take your command from you, (for I may probably add mine to you,) but to consult how we can best serve our Country, by detaching a part of this large force.”  Circumstances prevented his neighborly intention from taking effect.  A week later Nelson returned north with his squadron, and the friends did not meet until shortly before Trafalgar.

In reply to Nelson’s letter, Collingwood summed up his view of the situation as so far developed.  “I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object they had in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination—­that they will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the Bay,[108] and, taking the Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant—­perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more.  Admiral Cornwallis collecting his out squadrons may have thirty and upwards.  This appears to be a probable plan; for unless it is to bring their great fleets and armies to some point of service—­some rash attempt at conquest—­they have been only subjecting them to chance of loss, which I do not believe the Corsican would do, without the hope of an adequate reward.”

It is upon this letter, the sagacious and well-ordered inferences of which must be candidly admitted, that a claim for superiority of discernment over Nelson has been made for its writer.  It must be remembered, however, not as a matter of invidious detraction from one man, but in simple justice to the other, whose insight and belief had taken form in such wonderful work, that Nelson also had fully believed that the enemy, if they left the Mediterranean, would proceed to Ireland; and further, and yet more particularly, Collingwood’s views had been confirmed to him by the fact, as yet unknown to Nelson, that the Rochefort