with the French troops, at least unless they lay down their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and deliver up all the ships and stores of the port of Alexandria to the Allied Powers.”  Even in such case they would not be allowed to leave Egypt until exchanged.  Any persons that attempted to return, pursuant to an arrangement with one of the Allies, exclusive of the others, as the El-Arish Convention was, would be made prisoners of war.

Nelson’s opinions in this matter had never wavered.  As rumors of what was brewing got about, he wrote to the Earl of Elgin, on the 21st of December, 1800:  “I own my hope yet is, that the Sublime Porte will never permit a single Frenchman to quit Egypt; and I own myself wicked enough to wish them all to die in that country they chose to invade.  We have scoundrels of French enough in Europe without them.”  “I never would consent to one of them returning to the Continent of Europe during the war,” he tells Spencer Smith.  “I wish them to perish in Egypt, and give a great lesson to the world of the justice of the Almighty.”  When Elgin, thinking him still commander-in-chief, sent him the Convention, he replied formally:  “I shall forward the papers to Lord Keith, who will answer your Excellency.  But I cannot help most sincerely regretting that ever any countenance was given to the Turks to enter into such a treaty with the French; for I ever held it to be impossible to permit that army to return to Europe, but as prisoners of war, and in that case, not to France.  And was I commander-in-chief, even when the thing was done, I should have refused to ratify any consent or approbation of Sir Sidney Smith, and have wrote to both the Grand Vizir and the French General, the impossibility of permitting a vanquished army to be placed by one Ally in a position to attack another Ally.”  The last phrase put the facts in a nutshell, and illustrates well Nelson’s power of going straight to the root of a matter, disregardful of confusing side-issues, of policy or timidity.  To Hamilton he wrote passionately concerning the manifold difficulties caused to all, except the Turks and the Smiths.  “If all the wise heads had left them to God Almighty, after the bridge was broke, all would have ended well.  For I differ entirely with my commander-in-chief, in wishing they were permitted to return to France; and, likewise, with Lord Elgin on the great importance of removing them from Egypt.”

“I have wrote to Lord Keith, and home,” said Nelson to Sir Sidney Smith on the 15th of January, “that I did not give credit that it was possible for you to give any passport for a single Frenchman, much less the Army, after my positive order of March 18th, 1799.”  The words show what reports had already got about of the general trend of policy, on the part of the Porte and the British representatives; but the irony of the matter as regards Nelson is, that Smith disobeyed his orders, as he himself, six months before, had disobeyed Keith’s; and for