the islands,—–­ the French on the 30th of June to the northward of the group, while the British passed through it on the 8th of July.  He admitted, however, that he was doubtful in the matter.  “It is very uncertain whether they will go to Ferrol or Cadiz;” and nothing can indicate more clearly his perplexity, and his sense of the urgency of the case, than his parting on the same day with two of the four small cruisers he had with him, in order to insure that Ferrol as well as Gibraltar should have prompt warning.

It was at about this time that Nelson expressed, to one or more of his captains, his views as to what he had so far effected, what he had proposed to do if he had met the hostile fleets, and what his future course would be if they were yet found.  “I am thankful that the enemy have been driven from the West India Islands with so little loss to our Country.  I had made up my mind to great sacrifices; for I had determined, notwithstanding his vast superiority, to stop his career, and to put it out of his power to do any further mischief.  Yet do not imagine I am one of those hot brained people, who fight at an immense disadvantage, without an adequate object.[1] My object is partly gained,” that is, the allies had been forced out of the West Indies.”  If we meet them, we shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather think twenty sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I should not fall on them immediately:  we won’t part without a battle.[104] I think they will be glad to leave me alone, if I will let them alone; which I will do, either till we approach the shores of Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted.”

It is rare to find so much sagacious appreciation of conditions, combined with so much exalted resolution and sound discretion, as in this compact utterance.  Among the external interests of Great Britain, the West Indies were the greatest.  They were critically threatened by the force he was pursuing; therefore at all costs that force should be so disabled, that it could do nothing effective against the defences with which the scattered islands were provided.  For this end he was prepared to risk the destruction of his squadron.  The West Indies were now delivered; but the enemy’s force remained, and other British interests.  Three months before, he had said, “I had rather see half my squadron burnt than risk what the French fleet may do in the Mediterranean.”  In the same spirit he now repeats:  “Though we are but eleven to eighteen or twenty, we won’t part without a battle.”  Why fight such odds?  He himself has told us a little later.  “By the time the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no harm this year.”  Granting this conclusion,—­the reasonableness of which was substantiated at Trafalgar,—­it cannot be denied that the sacrifice would be justified, the enemy’s combinations being disconcerted.  Yet there shall be no headlong, reckless attack.